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Protecting data secrecy is an important design goal of computing systems. Conventional tech-
niques like access control mechanisms and cryptography are widely deployed, and yet security
breaches and data leakages still occur. There are several challenges. First, sensitivity of the sys-
tem data is not always easy to decide. Second, trustworthiness is not a constant property of the
system components and users. Third, a system’s functional requirements can be at odds with its
data protection requirements. In this dissertation, we show that efficient data protection can be
achieved by noising, masking, or metering sensitive data. Specifically, three practical problems
are addressed in the dissertation—storage side-channel attacks in Linux, server anonymity vio-
lations in web sessions, and data theft by malicious insiders. To mitigate storage side-channel
attacks, we introduce a differentially private system, dpprocfs, which injects noise into side-
channel vectors and also reestablishes invariants on the noised outputs. Our evaluations show that
dpprocfs mitigates known storage side channels while preserving the utility of the proc filesys-
tem for monitoring and diagnosis. To enforce server anonymity, we introduce a cloud service,
PoPSiCl, which masks server identifiers, including DNS names and IP addresses, with person-
alized pseudonyms. PoPSiCl can defend against both passive and active network attackers with
minimal impact to web-browsing performance. To prevent data theft from insiders, we introduce
a system, Snowman, which restricts the user to access data only remotely and accurately meters
the sensitive data output to the user by conducting taint analysis in a replica of the application
execution without slowing the interactive user session.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Protecting data secrecy is an important design goal of computing systems. A common ap-
proach is data isolation. In the classic multi-level security model [16], system data and system
components are categorized into various security levels. This model ensures that system compo-
nents can only read data in the same or lower security levels, so that information can only flow
from a lower level to a higher level but not vice versa. Modern computing systems adopt similar
concepts to protect data secrecy. In Linux, the memory data of the system kernel cannot be ac-
cessed by user-space processes. Similarly in Xen, the memory data of the hypervisor cannot be
accessed by virtual machine kernels and user-space processes.
Simple data isolation rules often cannot meet the data protection requirements of complicated
systems, especially in the multi-user environment. Many security mechanisms were proposed
to control the propagation of secret data. Access control mechanisms [135, 136, 151, 81, 138]
ensure that secret data can only be accessed by the users who have the required permissions.
Information-flow control mechanisms [134, 95, 52, 76, 24, 110] prevent secret data propagat-
ing to public data during the computation of the program. Many other security mechanisms
restrict the propagation of the secret data by hiding the contents of secret data. Cryptography
protocols [17, 131, 130, 168] encrypt secret data to ciphertext that can be only decrypted with
the private key. Anonymization schemes [148, 55, 69, 28, 78] scrub personal identifiers before
releasing the data to prevent re-identification.
Despite these efforts, data leakage incidents still frequently occur in computing systems [12,
49, 61]. There are several challenges. First, sensitivity of the system data is not always easy to
decide. We need to know what data to protect before deploying security mechanisms to protect
it. It is very obvious that some data is sensitive, e.g., private keys. However, some seemingly
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non-sensitive data is statistically correlated with sensitive data. This is a fundamental problem in
side-channel attacks where an attacker can conduct statistical analysis on non-sensitive data (e.g.,
cache timing information) to recover sensitive data (e.g., private key). Second, trustworthiness
is not a constant property of system components and users. The system kernel is trusted but an
attacker can control the kernel by exploiting vulnerabilities. Employees are trusted to access con-
fidential files but they might turn rogue and steal the confidential data. Third, system’s functional
requirements can be at odds with its data protection requirements. Sometimes sensitive data is
chosen to be exposed to untrusted system components in favor of meeting the system’s functional
requirements. For example, IP addresses in the network packets of a user are exposed to the Inter-
net service provider (ISP) because routers rely on the IP information to make routing decisions.
However, the ISP can also build a web browsing profile of the user based on the IP information,
which violates the user’s privacy.
In this dissertation, we propose novel data protection mechanisms to address unique chal-
lenges in three practical problems—storage side-channel attacks in Linux, server anonymity
violations in web sessions, and data theft by malicious insiders. Based on sensitivity of the sys-
tem data, trustworthiness of the system components, and functional requirements of the system,
we choose to either noise, mask, or meter sensitive data with the goal of protecting data secrecy
while maintaining normal system functionality.
1.1 Noising
A noising mechanism obfuscates sensitive data by adding random noise or modifying the
data value before releasing the sensitive data to untrusted parties. The goal of the noising mech-
anism is maintaining the utility of sensitive data while reducing the risk of security and privacy
violation.
In previous work, noising mechanisms have been applied to solve various problems. Privacy-
preserving data mining techniques (e.g., [7, 6, 152, 156]) aim to develop accurate data mining
models without access to precise information in individual data records. They use randomizing al-
2
gorithms to obfuscate individual data values and simultaneously preserve underlying distribution
properties at a macroscopic level. Privacy-control methods for statistical databases (e.g., [5, 56,
23, 62]) allow untrusted parties to query aggregate statistics of subsets of entities in the database
while protecting privacy of any individual entity represented in the database by adding noise
to the query results. Privacy-enhancing recommendation systems (e.g., [140, 141, 99]) obfus-
cate user data before releasing the data to recommendation servers with the goal of preserving
recommendation quality. k-anonymity and the derivative theorems [148, 92, 98] define rules to
obfuscate sensitive attributes of individuals before publishing data records so that an individual
cannot be easily identified from the published records. Adding noise is also used in defending
against side-channel attacks by reducing the precision of side-channel vectors [170, 154].
In our work, we propose a novel noising mechanism to defend against storage side-channel
attacks. A storage side channel occurs when an attacker accesses data objects influenced by an-
other victim computation and infers information about the victim that it is not permitted to learn
directly. In Linux, side-channel attackers exploit the runtime metadata, such as memory and
CPU usage of processes, from the proc filesystem (procfs) to recover secrets. In Chapter 2,
we introduce a differentially private system, dpprocfs, which adds noise to side-channel vec-
tors to provably mitigate storage side-channel attacks and simultaneously preserve the utility of
procfs for monitoring and diagnosis.
1.2 Masking
A masking mechanism transforms sensitive data to a form that hides its original contents
from the untrusted parties in the masking phase. The original data can be recovered from the
transformed data by the trusted parties in the unmasking phase. Masking mechanisms are very
useful in scenarios where sensitive data has to be stored in or transmitted by untrusted parties.
Masking mechanisms are mostly enabled by cryptographic algorithms, where the trusted
parties use cryptographic keys to encrypt and decrypt sensitive data. Secure communication
across an untrusted network is supported by cryptographic protocols (e.g., [130, 168]) which first
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authenticate communication endpoints and then mask and unmask sensitive data by encryption
and decryption. Secure cloud storage systems (e.g., [18, 166]) only store encrypted data in the
cloud storage and explore novel solutions to implement useful services on top of the encrypted
data, such as deduplication and auditing. Secure processor extensions (e.g., [101, 150]) encrypt
memory data of the trusted programs which cannot be undetectably altered by even the most
privileged system components, like operating system kernel or hypervisor.
Anonymous communication tools (e.g., [55, 69, 28, 78]) focus on protecting the identity of
the communication endpoints by masking and unmasking common identifiers, including DNS
names and IP addresses, besides protecting the communication contents by using encryption.
Server anonymity, which ensures that the server’s identity is hidden from network attackers and
eavesdroppers, is one of the anonymous properties guaranteed by these tools. In Chapter 3, we
introduce a cloud service, PoPSiCl, which enforces server anonymity for tenant servers running
in the cloud by masking server identifiers with personalized pseudonyms. Unlike most existing
anonymous tools, PoPSiCl requires no changes to client-side software and works with all major
web browsers. Our evaluations show that PoPSiCl only introduces modest overhead to server
access latency and throughput, and is capable of scaling to large numbers of users.
1.3 Metering
A metering mechanism monitors the amount of sensitive data leaked to the untrusted par-
ties and takes extra steps to protect data secrecy if the data access pattern deviates from normal
behaviors (e.g., the amount of leakage exceeds a certain limit).
Quantitative information flow analysis (e.g., [42, 43, 44, 96, 172]) quantifies the amount of
sensitive data leakage of a program by leveraging program analysis and formal modeling. With
the quantification of sensitive data leakage, flexible data protection policies can be enforced (e.g.,
allowing “small leakage” but preventing “large leakage”). In differential privacy [62], there is
a privacy budget which defines the maximum private information a user is allowed to get when
using the system. Every time a user makes a query, the system counts the amount of private data
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leakage and deducts the amount of leakage from the privacy budget. When the privacy budget
is used up, the user is not allowed to make future queries. This privacy budget based protection
is basically a metering mechanism, and is deployed in practical systems to protect privacy for
making SQL-like queries [103], doing MapReduce computations [132], using location-based
services [9, 25], and getting personalized recommendations [140, 102].
In our work, a novel metering mechanism is proposed to defend against data theft by insid-
ers, which involves misuse of permissions that the insider presumably must be given to perform
his/her duties in the organization. In Chapter 4, we introduce a system, Snowman, which restricts
the user to access data only remotely and accurately meters the sensitive data output to the user
through the graphical user interfaces. Under the protection of Snowman, malicious insiders ex-
filtrating large volumes of sensitive data in a short time span can be distinguished from normal
users. Also, Snowman conducts metering without slowing the interactive user session, by concur-
rently tracking leakage in a replica of the application execution.
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CHAPTER 2: DPPROCFS: NOISING SIDE-CHANNEL VECTORS TO MITIGATE
STORAGE SIDE CHANNELS1
Side-channel attacks aim at disclosing data in computer systems by exfiltrating sensitive
information through interfaces that are not designed for this purpose. In recent years, the scope of
side-channel attacks has been extended beyond their traditional use to attack cryptographic keys,
and techniques utilized in side-channel analysis have also increased in variety and sophistication.
In this chapter, we examine one particular type of side-channel attack vector, which we call
storage side channels. Storage side channels occur when an adversary accesses data objects as-
sociated with a victim computation and makes inferences about the victim based on the contents
of the data objects themselves or their metadata. As we use the term here, storage side channels
form a subclass of storage covert channels [114] that gleans information from an unwitting vic-
tim, versus receiving information inconspicuously from an accomplice. Storage side (and covert)
channels differ from legitimate communication channels since the data value or the metadata
exploited by the side channel is not considered sensitive by itself; yet, it still leaks information
that may be exploited to infer victim secrets.
A generic approach to mitigate storage side (and covert) channels is to reduce the accuracy of
the data or its metadata being reported by adding random noise to disturb side-channel observa-
tions [114]. A challenge in this approach is to develop principled mechanisms to perturb the side
channels with provable security guarantees, and to do so while preserving the utility of the data
and metadata in the system.
In this chapter, we present a novel approach to doing so by leveraging privacy concepts in
storage side-channel defense. By limiting data reporting to conform to differential privacy and
generalizations thereof, we show how to introduce noise into the data reporting so as to bound
1This chapter is excerpted from previously published work [161]
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information leakage mathematically. The difficulties in doing so, however, stem from the chal-
lenges in (i) modeling these storage channels as statistical databases, where differential privacy
was previously applied; (ii) designing privacy mechanisms to add noise so that side channels are
provably mitigated; and (iii) designing these mechanisms so as to minimize the loss of utility of
the released data. We will discuss methods to address these challenges in the remaining sections.
In theory, these methods can be applied to mitigating a variety of storage side channels. However,
in this chaper we illustrate the idea by focusing only on storage channels based on procfs, a
file-system interface for reporting resource usage information on Linux and Android systems.
Toward this end, we propose a modified procfs, dubbed dpprocfs, that provides guaran-
tees about the inferences possible from values reported through the procfs interfaces. In doing
so, dpprocfs defends against a variety of storage side channels recently exploited in procfs
on both Linux and Android (see Section 2.1.1 for a summary of these attacks). Our work builds
on the works of Dwork et al. [63, 64] and Chan et al. [33], which consider differential privacy un-
der continuous observations, but we are forced to extend from this starting point in multiple ways.
First, differential privacy itself is not a good match for side-channel mitigation in the procfs
context; rather, we turn to a recent generalization called d-privacy [35] that is parameterized by a
distance metric d. By defining a suitable distance metric d and expressing side-channel mitigation
goals in terms of the distance between two series of procfs observations, we prove that the
differentially private mechanism of Chan et al. [33] generalizes to mitigate storage side channels.
Second, however, the naive application of this mechanism to noise procfs outputs would risk
correctness of applications that depend on invariants that procfs outputs satisfy in practice. To
retain the utility of procfs, dpprocfs therefore extracts and reestablishes invariants on the
noised outputs so as to assist applications that depend on them.
We implemented dpprocfs for Linux as a suite that consists of an extension of the Linux
kernel, a userspace daemon process, and a software tool that is used for generating invariants
on the values of kernel data structures offline. The kernel extension alters the functionality of
procfs to enforce d-privacy on the exported data values while preserving the standard procfs
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interfaces. The userspace daemon interacts with the kernel extension to reestablish the invariants
procfs satisfies. We will elaborate on our implementation choices in later sections.
We evaluate our prototype for both its security and utility. For security, we demonstrate con-
figurations that effectively mitigate existing procfs side-channel attacks from the literature.
We specifically demonstrate preventing two attacks, one that uses procfs data to measure
keystroke behavior as a means to recover a typed input, and another that monitors the resource
usage of a browser process to determine the website it is accessing [82]. We evaluate the utility of
dpprocfs by measuring the relative error of protected fields and the similarity of the resource-
use rankings of processes by the popular top utility to those rankings without noise.
In summary, our contributions are as follows:
• We bring advances in privacy for statistical databases to bear on storage side-channel defense.
Specifically, we show that an existing mechanism due to Chan et al. [33] for enforcing dif-
ferential privacy under continuous binary data release extends to implement d-privacy for a
distance metric d∗ that can quantify storage side channels in procfs. We define this distance
metric d∗, argue its utility for capturing storage side channels, and prove that the Chan et al.
mechanism implements d∗-privacy.
• We identify a challenge in inserting noise into procfs outputs, namely the violation of in-
variants that procfs clients (and procfs code itself) might depend. Drawing from previous
research in invariant identification, we develop a tool for extracting invariants and impos-
ing them upon noised values prior to returning procfs outputs. In doing so, we ensure that
procfs outputs are consistent, even while being noised to interfere with side channels.
• We develop a working implementation of dpprocfs, our variant of procfs that imple-
ments storage side-channel defense, and evaluate both the protection it offers against pre-
viously published attacks and the utility it offers for monitoring and diagnosis. Our results
illustrate that side-channel defense can be accomplished while still maintaining the utility of
procfs for its intended purposes.
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 provides an overview of
storage side channel attacks via procfs, the background of differential privacy, and the theoret-
ical basis of d-privacy. Section 2.2 presents our design of dpprocfs, which is followed by de-
tails of its implementation in Section 2.3. We evaluate both the security and utility of dpprocfs
in Section 2.4 and discuss remaining challenges in Section 2.5. We summarize this chapter in
Section 2.6.
2.1 Background
2.1.1 Side Channel Attacks via PROCFS
procfs is a pseudo file system implemented in Linux, Android, and a few other UNIX-like
operating systems to facilitate userspace applications’ accesses to kernel-space information. Two
types of information are typically shared through procfs: per-process information and system-
wide information. Per-process information reveals configuration and state information about a
process, including path of the executable, environment variables, size of virtual and physical
memory, CPU and network usage, and so on. While some of the information should only be
consumed by the process itself, other information, especially statistics about resource usage, is
required for performance monitoring and diagnosis. For instance, in Linux, top, ps, iostat,
netstat, pidstat, and others rely on procfs to function. In Android, procfs is used for
apps to monitor the resource usage, e.g., transferred network data, of other apps.
This useful facility has been exploited to conduct side-channel attacks by several prior works.
Particularly of interest in our work are the attacks exploiting publicly available per-process in-
formation to infer secrets of the targeted process; see Table 2.1 for examples. The techniques
underlying these attacks are similar. Jana et al. [82] introduced an attack that, by reading from a
file in procfs, /proc/<pid>/statm, and learning the data resident size (drs) of a Chrome
browser, enables a malicious co-located application to infer the website it is visiting. The feature
used to differentiate multiple websites being browsed is the snapshot of the application’s memory
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Reference Description procfs files used Kernel fields
Jana et al. [82] Memory footprint
and context switches
of a browser process









































Table 2.1: Selected attacks leveraging storage side channels in the procfs file system
footprint. Zhou et al. [171] explored ways in Android to infer a victim app’s activity by monitor-
ing its network communications. Specifically, by sampling the files /proc/uid_stat/<ui
d>/tcp_rcv and /proc/uid_stat/<uid>/tcp_snd, an adversary is able to learn the
packet sizes sent and received by the victim app with high accuracy. Chen et al. [40] extracted
the victim app’s CPU utilization time, memory usage, and network usage from various procfs
files to classify the application’s behaviors. Lin et al. [94] also used utime to recognize a user’s
operation of the software keyboard on Android.
2.1.2 Differential Privacy
Privacy concerns arise when a database client learns information about individuals repre-
sented in the database through one or multiple queries to the database [5]. Differential privacy
puts constraints on publishing aggregate information from a statistical database which limits the
disclosure of private information of an individual in the database [62]. Prior to our work, differen-
tial privacy has been implemented in practical systems, e.g., to support privacy for data accessed
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through SQL-like queries [103] or MapReduce computations [132]. The security scenarios we
consider, however, differ from the statistical database privacy model in two dimensions: First,
storage side channels revolve around information leakage due to an attacker continuously mon-
itoring the same data as it changes over time. Statistical databases are typically static, however.
Second, database indistinguishability is not well defined under our security model, and hence we
need to adapt the definition of differential privacy for our intended purposes.
We build our work upon two lines of research in the literature. The first line is concerned with
differential privacy with continuous data release [63, 64, 33]. In these works, the continuous data
release takes the form of a sequence of binary values, and only sequences that differ in a single
binary value are rendered indistinguishable to the attacker. In the model we consider, in contrast,
the continuous data release can be characterized as a sequence of integers, and even sequences
that differ in multiple values might need to be rendered indistinguishable. The second line of
research generalizes the definition of differential privacy for statistical databases. In particular,
Chatzikokolakis et al. [35] broadened the definition of differential privacy by parameterizing the
definition with a distance metric d, and requiring that the degree of indistinguishability of two
databases be a function of their distance. (The original definition of differential privacy can be
viewed as a special case for Hamming distance [35].) We build from this approach, defining a
metric d that applies to storage side channels and implementing this defense in a working system.
2.1.3 d-Privacy
In our work we leverage a generalization of differential privacy due to Chatzikokolakis et
al. [35] called d-privacy, which we summarize here briefly. (Our summary is not of the most
general form of d-privacy, however.) A metric d on a set X is a function d : X 2 → [0,∞)
satisfying d(x, x) = 0, d(x, x′) = d(x′, x), and d(x, x′′) ≤ d(x, x′) + d(x′, x′′) for all x, x′, x′′ ∈
X . A randomized algorithm A : X → Z satisfies (d, ε)-privacy if
P (A(x) ∈ Z) ≤ exp(ε× d(x, x′))× P (A(x′) ∈ Z)
11
for all Z ⊆ Z .
We leverage the following composition property of d-privacy:
Proposition 1. If A : X → Z is (d, ε)-private and A′ : X → Z ′ is (d, ε′)-private, then A′′ : X 2 →
Z ×Z ′ defined by A′′(x, x′) = (A(x), A′(x′)) satisfies
P (A′′(x, x′) ∈ Z × Z ′) ≤ exp(ε× d(x, x′′) + ε′ × d(x′, x′′′))
× P (A′′(x′′, x′′′) ∈ Z × Z ′)
for any Z ⊆ Z , any Z ′ ⊆ Z ′, and any x, x′, x′′, x′′′ ∈ X .
Proof of Prop. 1.
P (A′′(x, x′) ∈ Z × Z ′)
= P (A(x) ∈ Z)× P (A′(x′) ∈ Z ′)
≤ exp(ε× d(x, x′′))× P (A(x′′) ∈ Z)
× exp(ε′ × d(x′, x′′′))× P (A′(x′′′) ∈ Z ′)
= exp(ε× d(x, x′′) + ε′ × d(x′, x′′′))
× P (A′′(x′′, x′′′) ∈ Z × Z ′)
Let Z and R denote the integers and reals, respectively. In the case X = Zn, a metric that will






where x = 〈x[1] , . . . , x[n]〉.
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. Then, for any x, x′ ∈ Zn and Z ⊆ Rn,
P (A(x) ∈ Z) ≤ exp(ε× dL1(x, x′))× P (A(x′) ∈ Z)
Proof of Prop. 2. First note that for any i and any z ∈ Z ,
P (x[i] + ri = z)




= exp(−ε× (|x[i]− z| − |x′[i]− z|))
= exp(ε× (|x′[i]− z| − |x[i]− z|))
≤ exp(ε× (|x[i]− x′[i] |))
The result then follows from Prop. 1.
2.2 Design of a d-Private Procfs
In an effort to suppress information leakages in procfs such as those described in Section 2.1.1,
we devise a new procfs-like file system, called dpprocfs, that leverages differential pri-
vacy principles. In this section, we describe how we apply these principles in the design of
dpprocfs.
2.2.1 Threat Model
This work considers side-channel attacks exploiting statistics values exported by procfs
from co-located applications running within the same OS. In particular, we consider the default
settings of procfs, which do not restrict accesses to a process’ private directories in procfs
by other processes from different users. Such settings are very typical in traditional desktop
environments or shared server hosting environments running all kinds of Linux distributions, and
mobile devices running Android. We assume the OS kernel and the root user of the system are
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not compromised. Accordingly, security attacks due to software vulnerabilities are beyond the
scope of consideration.
2.2.2 Design Overview
When a procfs file is open and read, the data read are created on-the-fly by the Linux ker-
nel. To create the file data, the kernel draws information from several data structures. Exam-
ples include the task struct structure that describes a process or task in the system, and the
mm struct structure that describes the virtual memory of a process.
One option to interfere with adversary inferences about victim processes using values ob-
tained from procfs would be to add noise to those values directly, just before outputting them.
Unfortunately, there are numerous outputs from procfs with complex relationships among
them, and so we determined that adding noise to the underlying kernel data-structure field val-
ues used to calculate procfs outputs would be a more manageable design choice. In particular,
there are fewer such fields, and while there remain relationships among them (more on that be-
low), they are reduced in number and complexity.
So, in the design of dpprocfs, we treat updates to the relevant per-process kernel data
structures as constituting a “database” x that represents the evolution of the process since its
inception. That is, consider a conceptual database x to which a record is added each time one
or more of a process’ kernel data-structure fields changes. The columns of x correspond to the
numeric fields of the per-process kernel data structures consulted by procfs. So, for example,
the mm struct.total vm field, which indicates the total number of virtual memory pages of
a process, is represented by a column in x. As the process executes, a new record is appended to
x anytime the value in one of these fields changes. Each time a procfs file is read, the values
returned are assembled from what is, in effect, the most recently added row of the database x. We
stress, however, that this database is conceptual only, and does not actually exist in dpprocfs.
We design an algorithm to implement d-privacy per column of x (i.e., per data-structure
field), relying on Prop. 1 to bound the information leaked from multiple columns simultaneously.
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Since each column of the database x corresponds to a specific field in a kernel data structure, our
mechanism is applied each time a field in a protected data structure is read by procfs code. For
the remainder of this chapter, we adjust our notation so that the database x represents a single
column corresponding to that data-structure field. We refer to x[i] as the value of the last element
of that column (i.e., the field in the kernel data structure corresponding to the column) when the
i-th access occurs (i.e., i = 1 is the first access to the data-structure field).
Even to limit leakage from a single column, it is necessary to decide on a distance metric
d for which to implement d-privacy. While we might not know exactly how the adversary uses
the procfs outputs to infer information about a victim process, we can glean guidance from
known attacks. For example, Zhou et al. [171] discuss how they used procfs output based
on the uid stat.tcp snd field to infer when a victim sent a tweet (a la Twitter) as follows:
“a tweet is considered to be sent when the increment sequence is either (420—150, 314, 580–
720) or (420—150, 894–1034).” [171, Section 3.2] That is, their attack works by reading from
procfs four times in a short interval to obtain values x[1], x[2], x[3], x[4] where x denotes the
uid stat.tcp snd field, and deciding that a tweet was sent if either x[2]− x[1] ∈ {150, 420},
x[3]−x[2] = 314, and x[4]−x[3] ∈ {580, . . . , 720} or x[2]−x[1] ∈ {150, 420} and x[3]−x[2] ∈
{894, . . . , 1034}. So, to interfere with this attack, it is necessary to render these readings from the
“database” x indistinguishable from readings from an alternative “database” x′ that reflects a run





|(x[i]− x[i− 1])− (x′[i]− x′[i− 1])|
Proposition 3. d∗ is a metric.
15
Proof of Prop. 3. For any x, x′ ∈ Zn, the properties d∗(x, x) = 0 and d∗(x, x′) = d∗(x′, x) are









(x[i]− x[i− 1])− (x′[i]− x′[i− 1])









|(x′[i]− x′[i− 1])− (x′′[i]− x′′[i− 1])|
= d∗(x, x′) + d∗(x′, x′′)
The distance d∗ captures the distinguishability of consecutive pairs of observations of a data-
structure field via procfs, and so by defining d∗ in this way (and choosing ε appropriately),
we ensure that a (d∗, ε)-private mechanism can hide the differences between x and x′ that, e.g.,
enabled Zhou et al. to identify a tweet being sent in their attack.
Moreover, adopting d∗ is plausibly of use in defending against a much broader range of at-
tacks, since d∗-privacy implies dL1-privacy:
Proposition 4. If A is (d∗, ε)-private, then A is (dL1, 2ε)-private.











|x[i− 1]− x′[i− 1] |
≤ 2× dL1(x, x′)
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Therefore, if A : X → Z is (d∗, ε)-private, then we have that for any x, x′ ∈ X and any Z ⊆ Z ,
P (A(x) ∈ Z)
P (A(x′) ∈ Z)
≤ exp(ε× d∗(x, x′))
≤ exp(ε× 2dL1(x, x′))
= exp(2ε× dL1(x, x′))
Since any p-point metric space can be embedded in L1 distance with O(log p) distortion [4],
making it difficult to distinguish x and x′ with low d∗ (and hence L1) distance should make it
more difficult to distinguish them via other distance metrics, too.
One challenge of using d-privacy to protect information from kernel data structures used in
responding to procfs reads is that the information obtained through procfs might become
inconsistent. That is, our mechanism might break data-structure invariants on which the procfs
code or the clients of procfs rely. dpprocfs therefore reestablishes these invariants on the
d-private values prior to providing them to procfs code. So, for example, since enforcing d-
privacy adds noise to the mm struct.total vm and mm struct.shared vm values, the
resulting values might fail to satisfy the invariant mm struct.total vm ≥ mm struct
.shared vm. dpprocfs thus adjusts mm struct.total vm and mm struct.shared vm
to reestablish this invariant before permitting them to be used by the procfs code. In Section 2.2.4,
we describe how we generate the invariants for these kernel data structures and how we reestab-
lish those invariants on d-private values. Note that these invariants are public information: they
can be extracted statically or dynamically via the same methods we obtain them, and post-processing
d-private values to reestablish these invariants does not impinge on their d-privacy (cf., [74]).
2.2.3 d∗-Private Mechanism Design
In this section we describe the mechanism we use to implement d∗-privacy for the conceptual
single-column database x described above. This mechanism is due to Chan et al. [33], though
17
they considered only the case where x[i+ 1]− x[i] ∈ {0, 1} and, moreover, differential privacy (so
that x[i+ 1]−x[i] 6= x′[i+ 1]−x′[i] for only one i), rather than d∗-privacy as we do here. As such,
our primary contribution is in proving that this mechanism generalizes to implement d∗-privacy
and does so for vectors over the natural numbers.
Let N denote the natural numbers and D(i) ∈ N denote the largest power of two that divides
i; i.e., D(i) = 2j if and only if 2j|i and 2j+16 | i. Note that i = D(i) if and only if i is a power of
two. The mechanism A computes a value x̃[i] that is used in place of x[i] in the procfs code
using the recurrence
x̃[i] = x̃[G(i)] + (x[i]− x[G(i)]) + ri (2.1)




0 if i = 1
i/2 if i = D(i) ≥ 2


















So, for example, the first eight queries to x result in the following return values, where ri
$←
Lap (b) denotes sampling randomly according to the distribution Lap (b).
















































Chan et al. characterize the amount of noise introduced by the mechanism described above,
which grows only logarithmically in i, specifically:




)× (blog ic)3/2 × ε−1
)
.
Our main contribution as it relates to this mechanism design lies in showing the following
result:
Proposition 6. The algorithm in Eqns. 2.1–2.3 is (d∗, 2ε)-private.







































































|(x[i]− x[i− 1])− (x′[i]− x′[i− 1])|
)
(2.4)
Similarly, for any i > D(i) and any zi,
P ((x[i]− x[i−D(i)]) + ri = zi)




× |(x[i]− x[i−D(i)])− (x′[i]− x′[i−D(i)])|
)
where k = blog2 ic. For any fixed j and k,
∏
i ∈ (2k, 2k+1)
: D(i) = 2j
P ((x[i]− x[i−D(i)]) + ri = zi)







i ∈ (2k, 2k+1)
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P ((x[i]− x[i−D(i)]) + ri = zi)





































P ((x[1]− x[0]) + ri = zi)
P ((x′[1]− x′[0]) + ri = zi)
≤ exp (ε× |(x[1]− x[0])− (x′[1]− x′[0])|) (2.6)
by Prop. 2. So, for any x, x′ ∈ X n and any 〈z1, . . . , zn〉,
P (A(x) = 〈z1, . . . , zn〉)

















|(x[i]− x[i− 1])− (x′[i]− x′[i− 1])|
)
where the last step follows by multiplying Eqn. 2.6, Eqn. 2.4, and Eqn. 2.5.
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2.2.4 Consistency Enforcement
The values provided to procfs code, once rendered d∗-private by the mechanism described
in Section 2.2.3, are processed as usual by the procfs code to produce the values served as the
contents of the queried procfs files. By adding noise to these values, however, it is possible
that we cause them to violate invariants on which the procfs code or the reader of the procfs
files depends. As such, prior to providing the d∗-private values to the procfs code, we process
these values to re-establish invariants on which this code might depend.
Specifically, the invariants we reestablish are of two types, namely one-field or multiple-field.
A one-field invariant holds between the values of the same data-structure field when queried at
two different times. For example, the fact that the task struct.utime field is monotonically
nondecreasing is a one-field invariant. In contrast, a multiple-field invariant holds among the
values of two or more data-structure fields accessed at the same time, e.g., mm struct
.hiwater rss < mm struct.shared vm. There could also be invariants that hold among
the values of two or more data-structure fields accessed at different times, though we do not
consider such invariants here.
Techniques for invariant identification range from static (e.g., [173]) to dynamic (e.g., [67])
and combinations thereof (e.g., [51]). While dpprocfs is agnostic to the method of invariant
generation, the type we explored for our prototype is dynamic. Intuitively, in this approach we
execute the system under a variety of workloads, taking snapshots of the relevant kernel data
structures after they are updated. We then post-process these snapshots to identify properties
that held consistently in all executions. Obviously we cannot detect all such properties (there
are infinitely many that could be inferred from finitely many traces), nor is identifying all of
them strictly necessary. (We return to this issue in Section 2.5.) In Section 2.3.2, we detail the
invariants that dpprocfs enforces in our current implementation, though we stress that these
invariants can be generated through a combination of techniques—including manually.
Enforcing these invariants involves processing the data-structure field values output by the
d∗-private mechanism described in Section 2.2.3 to satisfy these invariants. More specifically,
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any attempt to read from a procfs file will cause an access to certain data-structure fields. The
values in these fields and in any other fields related to them by multi-field invariants (even transi-
tively) are each subjected to the d∗-private mechanism of Section 2.2.3, producing a noised value
x̃[i] to replace the actual value x[i] in this, the i-th, access to this field. These outputs are then
altered to satisfy relevant single-field and multiple-field invariants, resulting in a final output x̂[i]
for further processing by the kernel routine that produces the contents of the accessed procfs
file.
In Section 2.3.3, we explore two ways of manipulating these outputs to satisfy invariants. In
the first, to which we refer as computing a heuristic solution to the invariants, dpprocfs lever-
ages a hand-implemented algorithm to deterministically modify the outputs to conform. This
method is very efficient, but might alter the outputs more than other ways of satisfying the invari-
ants might. In the second approach, to which we refer as computing the nearest solution to the
invariants, we generate an integer programming problem with the invariants as constraints and an
objective of minimizing the total magnitude of the changes to the d∗-private outputs to conform
to the invariants. We then feed this integer program to a commercial solver (in our current imple-
mentation, CPLEX2) to compute an optimal solution. We stress that both the heuristic and nearest
solutions are computed using invariants that an adversary can compute himself (i.e., are public),
and so this post-processing does not erode the d∗-privacy of these outputs.
2.3 Implementation
We implemented dpprocfs as a suite of software tools in Ubuntu Linux LTS 14.04 with
kernel version 3.13.11. dpprocfs consists of three components: a kernel extension, which we
call privfs, that enhances the procfs with d∗-private mechanisms (as discussed in Section 2.2.3)
without altering its existing program interfaces; a software tool, invgen, that automatically
searches for invariants in kernel data structures for maintaining procfs value consistency (as
2http://www.ibm.com/software/commerce/optimization/cplex-optimizer/
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discussed in Section 2.2.4); and a userspace daemon, privfsd, that interacts with the kernel
extension and facilitates consistency enforcement in real time.
2.3.1 d∗-Private Mechanism Implementation
When a file in procfs is read by a userspace process, a kernel function is invoked to serve
the request, and the return values are sent to the process as if it is reading a file. The values re-
ported by procfs are computed from fields in certain kernel data structures. To generate d∗-
private outputs, a kernel extension privfs computes noised versions of those protected fields
for use by the kernel function computing the procfs output.
Specifically, privfs introduces a kernel data structure of type privfs struct per ker-
nel data-structure field x that is protected (rendered d∗-private) by dpprocfs. This structure
includes two arrays of floating-point values. After access i to the data-structure field x to which
the privfs struct structure is associated, position log2D(i) in these arrays are updated to








, which the struc-
ture also stores, these arrays permit the efficient computation of x̃[i+ 1]. Also to speed up this
computation, the privfs struct structure maintains a buffer of 32B to store precomputed
random values ri+1, ri+2, . . . following the specified Laplace distributions. Buffer refilling is
implemented as a tasklet, a type of software IRQ in Linux kernels.
The arrays in privfs struct in our present implementation are of fixed length, specifi-
cally 32 floating-point values, which limits the number of queries to the protected data-structure
field to 232 − 1. These arrays might instead be made arbitrarily extensible so as to allow an un-
limited number of queries. That said, as the query count i grows, the accuracy of the returned
x̃[i] value decays. As such, alternative designs might limit (or rate-limit) the number of queries
to any protected data-structure field by each userspace process or its associated user. Another
implementation choice might be to maintain separate arrays for each user of the system, so that
queries from one user would not decrease the utility of queries from other users.
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privfs does not return x̃[i] directly for use in computing the procfs output. Instead, it
sends this value to privfsd for enforcing invariants across all noised values. privfsd will
be discussed in Section 2.3.3, after we discuss how data-structure invariants are identified in
Section 2.3.2.
2.3.2 Invariant Generation
Kernel data-structure invariants are generated by a component called invgen. invgen
generates two types of invariants, namely one-field and multiple-field invariants as discussed in
Section 2.2.4. One-field invariants are relationships between a field’s current and previous values.
Multiple-field invariants are relationships between different variables when accessed at the same
time.
As discussed in Section 2.2.4, our system generates invariants from traces of data-structure
values captured during execution. Specifically, invgen does so by collecting execution traces of
all numerical data-structure fields that are relevant to procfs outputs. To do so, we patch an OS
kernel by adding one more file in the procfs to directly export all numeric kernel data-structure
fields of interest. invgen then repeatedly reads the extended procfs file, sampling the values
of these fields frequently and writing them into trace files. For this work, traces were collected
by monitoring the data-structure fields during the execution of a variety of software programs,
including Google Chrome and a set of benchmark applications from Phoronix Test Suite3. By
executing each benchmark application three times, we collected 22.6MB of trace files.
We then used Daikon [67] to extract invariants from these trace files. To use Daikon, we first
configured it with invariant templates, or filters, that the tool uses to search for invariants. For
one-field invariants, Daikon was configured with filters to locate fields that do not change, that
are monotonically nonincreasing, or that are monotonically nondecreasing. For multiple-field
invariants, we implemented a filter that Daikon uses to search for linear invariants among a set X
of fields, i.e., a property of the form
∑
x∈X cx × x[i] ≥ 0 that holds for all i, for some constant
3http://www.phoronix-test-suite.com
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cx ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. We ran Daikon with this filter for two sets X , one for memory-related fields and
one for scheduler-related fields. After using Daikon to extract likely invariants in this way, we
manually inspected the outputs and discarded those that were either implied by others or that we
believed to be spurious. For example, if we get invariants a > b, b > c, and a > c, then a > c
can be omitted, because it is implied by the previous two invariants. Other similar implication
relationships among invariants can be processed in the same way.
The invariants produced in this way are shown in Table 2.2. (We also include invariants that
all fields are integral, but we do not show those, for brevity.) The right half of the table shows
the invariants expressed using the labels for kernel data-structure fields indicated in the left half
of the table. The fields marked “Protected” in the left half of the table are those that dpprocfs
renders d∗-private in our present implementation. Those fields marked with a “z” were selected
based on their use in existing attacks (see Section 2.1.1), and those marked with a “checkmark”
were selected for protection because they are included in invariants with such fields. One field,
namely uptime, is not protected in our present implementation despite being included in invari-
ants, simply because the information it carries (the time since the machine was booted) seems
unlikely to carry information useful to a side-channel attack. That said, it could also be protected
with minimal additional cost.
The upper right corner of the right half of Table 2.2 lists one-field invariants, e.g., that
task struct.utime[i] (the i-th access to task struct.utime) is at least as large as
task struct.utime[i− 1]. That is, task struct.utime[i] is nondecreasing. The other
invariants hold for all simultaneous accesses to the indicated fields.
Our chosen method of invariant generation is admittedly limited, in that like any method of
invariant generation based on an incomplete set of recorded traces, it allows for false positives
and false negatives. False positives—i.e., found “invariants” that are not actually invariants—
will presumably not cause difficulties for the procfs code or applications when dpprocfs
enforces them, since even if not invariant, the identified behavior is evidently common. False neg-
atives (i.e., missed invariants) might cause such problems, however, and so it would be prudent to
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Data-structure field Protected Label
mm struct.total vm z totalVM
mm struct.shared vm z sharedVM
mm struct.stack vm X stackVM
mm struct.exec vm X execVM
mm struct.rss stat
.count[MM FILEPAGES] z filePages
mm struct.rss stat
.count[MM ANONPAGES] z anonPages
mm struct.rss stat
.count[MM SWAPENTS] X swapEnts
mm struct.hiwater rss X hiwaterRSS
mm struct.hiwater vm X hiwaterVM
task struct.utime z utime
task struct.stime X stime
task struct.gtime X gtime
task struct.signal->cstime X cstime
task struct.signal->cutime X cutime
task struct.real start time X starttime
task struct.nvcsw z nvcsw
task struct.nivcsw z nivcsw
get monotonic boottime() uptime
Invariants
totalVM ≥ 0 swapEnts ≥ 0 cstime ≥ 0 utime[i] ≥ utime[i− 1]
sharedVM ≥ 0 hiwaterRSS ≥ 0 cutime ≥ 0 stime[i] ≥ stime[i− 1]
stackVM ≥ 0 hiwaterVM ≥ 0 nvcsw ≥ 0 gtime[i] ≥ gtime[i− 1]
execVM ≥ 0 utime ≥ 0 nivcsw ≥ 0 cstime[i] ≥ cstime[i− 1]
filePages ≥ 0 stime ≥ 0 cutime[i] ≥ cutime[i− 1]
anonPages ≥ 0 gtime ≥ 0 nvcsw[i] ≥ nvcsw[i− 1]
nivcsw[i] ≥ nivcsw[i− 1]
hiwaterRSS < sharedVM starttime[i] = starttime[i− 1]
hiwaterVM ≥ filePages
execVM ≥ filePages + swapEnts
sharedVM + filePages ≥ anonPages + swapEnts
sharedVM + execVM ≥ filePages + anonPages + swapEnts
sharedVM ≥ execVM + filePages + swapEnts
totalVM ≥ execVM + stackVM + filePages + anonPages + swapEnts
totalVM ≥ sharedVM + stackVM + swapEnts
totalVM + filePages ≥ sharedVM + anonPages + swapEnts
totalVM + execVM ≥ sharedVM + stackVM + filePages
+ anonPages + swapEnts
uptime ≥ starttime + utime + stime + gtime + cutime + cstime
Table 2.2: Selected kernel data-structure fields (Linux kernel 3.13) and generated invariants
(Section 2.3.2) that reference them. “Protected” fields are rendered d∗-private as described in
Section 2.3.1, either because they have been utilized in published side-channel attacks (z) or
because they are involved in invariants that include such fields (X).
augment our dynamic approach with static analysis (e.g., [51, 173]) and additional manual inspec-
tion. That said, we have not identified applications (or kernel routines that respond to procfs
reads) that appear to depend on behaviors other than those identified in Table 2.2.
2.3.3 Reestablishing Invariants
Upon producing x̃[i] for each protected field x needed by a kernel routine to respond to a
procfs query,4 privfs needs to reestablish the invariants among those field values before
submitting them to the kernel routine. For our prototype, we implemented this step in a userspace
daemon process, which we call privfsd, that receives requests from the privfs via Netlink
sockets. This implementation choice allows us to sidestep the need to port more complex opera-
tions (e.g., floating-point operations, constraint-solving algorithms) to run in the kernel.
4We are abusing notation here slightly, in that the access index i might be different per field x.
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privfs produces inputs for privfsd by first identifying the set X of protected fields to
be accessed by the kernel routine serving the procfs query (i.e., from those fields marked
“protected” in Table 2.2). privfs forms the set of relevant invariants from Table 2.2, namely
I(X ) =
⋃
x∈X I(x) where I(x) for any x is defined using the following inductive definition:
(i) I(x) is initialized to include any constraint in Table 2.2 that includes field x; and (ii) if any
protected field x′ from Table 2.2 is named in an invariant already in I(x), then I(x′) is added
to I(x). privfs instantiates each protected field x named in I(X ) with a variable x̂[i] and, if
uptime ∈ I(X ), instantiates uptime with its current value. privfs then produces the relevant
value x̃[i] for each field x ∈ X and sends I(X ) and the noised values {x̃[i]}x∈X to privfsd.
privfsd operates in one of two modes, computing either a nearest compliant assignment
to each x̂[i] or a heuristic assignment to each x̂[i]. The nearest assignment is calculated by tak-
ing the instantiated invariants I(X ) as constraints in an integer programming (IP) problem, with
variables {x̂[i]}x∈X and objective being to minimize the cumulative relative error, i.e., to min-
imize
∑
x∈X |x̃[i] − x̂[i] |/|x̃[i] |. Our current implementation invokes CPLEX to solve this IP
problem. In contrast, the heuristic approach simply calculates any values for {x̂[i]}x∈X that sat-
isfy I(X ) using manually coded heuristics to adjust the {x̃[i]}x∈X values. Basically, the heuristic
approach simply increases or decreases each x̂[i] to satisfy the equality or inequality relation in
the invariant. In Section 2.4, we will evaluate both modes of operation. Regardless of its mode
of operation, privfsd returns the computed values {x̂[i]}x∈X to privfs to pass along to the
kernel routine for preparing the procfs output to the waiting client.
2.4 Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the efficacy of dpprocfs design. While our design is provably
d∗-private (and hence dL1-private by Prop. 4), we perform an empirical security evaluation of
our design in Section 2.4.1 to better illustrate settings of ε that suffice to interfere with known
attacks. With greater clarity as to reasonable settings of ε, we then evaluate the utility of procfs
for these ε values in Section 2.4.2.
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2.4.1 Security Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the capability of dpprocfs to defend against side-channel at-
tacks discussed in Section 2.1.1. Specifically, we measure the extent to which the procfs fea-
tures used by the attacker in selected attacks are still effective attack features in dpprocfs.
Rather than trying to replicate each attack from previous work exactly, we adopt a more general
framework for evaluation in which the attacker’s task is detecting one of m classes of activities.
We perform this measurement of the attacker’s likely success by building a multiclass clas-
sifier for classifying procfs features (which are attack-dependent) into one of m classes. We
use the scikit-learn5 support-vector-machine (SVM) implementation to build the multiclass
classifier. We then report the accuracy of the classifier in a testing phase, namely the fraction of
test instances that it classifies correctly.
2.4.1.1 Defending Against Keystroke Timing Attacks
A user’s interactions with the hardware keyboard can trigger context switches from the user-
space application to the operating system kernel to handle keystrokes. The voluntary context
switch counter (nvcsw in Table 2.2) can be exploited to identify a user’s keystroke actions and
hence the timing characteristics of those keystrokes. These timing characteristics can then leak
information about what those keystrokes were (e.g., [146]). To approximate the defense that
dpprocfs offers against this attack, we consider an adversary that consecutively reads the
nvcsw field from procfs six times, and then the adversary classifies this vector of readings to
determine when the keystroke occurred. (We only inject one keystroke during these six readings.)
As such, we model the attacker as a multi-class classifier, which classifies the vector of six read-
ings (i.e., a vector in N6) into m = 5 classes; classifying a vector as class i indicates that the
keystroke occurred between reads i and i+ 1.
To perform these experiments, we used a tool called xdotool to simulate the keystroke ac-
tions at a specified time. During each experiment run, we started a bash terminal and injected
5http://scikit-learn.org/dev/index.html
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one keystroke, at a time distributed normally with mean 2.5s and standard deviation 0.83s (i.e.,
0.0s is three standard deviations from the mean). Beginning with the launch of the bash process,
the attacker process read the /proc/<pid>/status file of the bash process every second6
to obtain the voluntary context switch counter nvcsw, yielding six readings (a vector in N6). In-
variant enforcement (Section 2.3.3) provided the nearest solution to the needed invariants. To
allow for a powerful attacker, we provided to it the underlying normal distribution imposed on the
keystroke timing. The attacker used this distribution to estimate the true (unnoised) nvcsw value
corresponding to each vector element (adapting [111, Eqn. 10]), yielding an estimated true vector
per collected vector. We repeated this experiment 440 times to get 440 estimated true vectors.
When training and testing the SVM classifier, we used 75% of the vectors from each class for
training and 25% for testing.
The accuracy of the resulting classifier on the testing examples is shown in Figure 2.1a. The
horizontal axis shows various values of ε; the vertical axis shows classifier accuracy. Because of
the form of the distribution imposed on keystroke timings, the most likely class occurred roughly
44% of the time, and so this baseline (shown by the horizontal dashed line) is the accuracy that
the adversary could achieve simply by blindly guessing based on that distribution. As shown in
the graph, setting ε ∈ [1, 3] suffices to reduce the classifier to this baseline accuracy. By compari-
son, the classifier was perfect (an accuracy of 1.0) when no noise was added.
2.4.1.2 Mitigating Website Inference
The memory footprint of a browser can leak the website it visits (as discussed in Section 2.1.1).
In this experiment, we instrumented the Google Chrome browser with a script to visit a target
website, chosen uniformly from the Alexa top-10 websites. While this occurred, an attacker pro-
cess repeatedly sampled the data resident size field drs, calculated as totalVM− sharedVM (using
6This interval is much longer than in the demonstrated attack of Jana et al. [82], but we lengthened this interval to
minimize ambiguity regarding the class i ∈ {1 . . . 5} to which each vector should be assigned for training. By
increasing this interval, we believe we produced classification results that are conservative (i.e., advantageous for
the attacker).
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(a) Keystroke timing attack













(b) Website inference attack
Figure 2.1: Multi-class classifier accuracy under different ε settings; dashed horizontal lines show
accuracies of blind guesses based only on knowledge of the likelihood of each class
the labels defined in Table 2.2), by reading the /proc/<pid>/statm of the browser process
every 500µs. To support this rate of sampling, dpprocfs employed the heuristic method of
invariant reestablishment (Section 2.3.3), which returned results in roughly 50µs (in comparison
to 8ms for the nearest solution). The sampling period lasted for 3s, during which the attack pro-
cess recorded all the drs field values read. As in Section 2.4.1.1, the attacker estimated the true
(unnoised) drs value corresponding to the j-th read value in each 3s interval, using an empirical
distribution observed for these j-th values gathered by accessing each of these 10 websites an
equal number of times. The attacker then constructed a histogram of these estimated drs values
binned into seven equal-width bins, and the vector of bin counts (in N7) was used as a feature
vector for classification. Each of the Alexa top-10 websites were visited 100 times; when used
to train and test the SVM classifier (with m = 10 classes), 70% were used for training and 30%
were used for testing.
The resulting accuracy of the classifier is shown in Figure 2.1b. The most important distinc-
tion from the graph in Figure 2.1a is that the values of ε needed to interfere with the website
inference attack are much smaller, meaning that the noise added was greater. This is primarily a
function of the size differences between drs readings from the m classes, which were generally
much greater than the differences between the readings of the voluntary context switch counter
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nvcsw with and without a keystroke. In terms of d∗, the distances between the classes in the web-
site inference attack were much greater than the distances between classes in the keystroke attack.
This is noteworthy because it implies that the settings of ε needed for privacy will differ per-field
and per-application and, to some extent, will need to be informed by known attacks. Still, how-
ever, several values tested for ε decayed classification accuracy to a significant extent; with no
noise added, the classifier reached 0.915 accuracy.
2.4.2 Utility Evaluation
We evaluate the utility of dpprocfs in two ways. First, we measure the relative error of
selected procfs outputs that are calculated using fields protected by dpprocfs, under the
two methods discussed in Section 2.3.3 for enforcing invariants, namely producing a heuristic
solution and a nearest solution to the invariants. Second, we report the impact of dpprocfs to
the ranking of processes according to certain features by top, a common utility for monitoring
and diagnosis. Here we focus on dpprocfs outputs such as memory and CPU usage, as these
are generally useful systems diagnostics.
2.4.2.1 Relative Error
We begin our utility evaluation by measuring the relative error of the drs field, the same field
exploited by website inference attackers (see Section 2.4.1.2). To calculate the relative error of
this field under dpprocfs, we preserved access to an unprotected version of procfs alongside
the protected version. Then, we extended our setup described in Section 2.4.1.2 to simultaneously
query both the protected and unprotected versions of the drs field while the browser process
was running. During the evaluation, the browser was instrumented to repeatedly visit https:
//www.youtube.com, and the drs field was queried every 50ms for a total of 500 queries. We
repeated this experiment 200 times.
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Figure 2.2: Comparison between nearest
and heuristic invariant reestablishment for
drs field; ε = 0.005
Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of relative
error for both the nearest and heuristic solutions
for invariant reestablishment, computed on the
same noised values x̃ produced by privfs, for
a parameter setting (ε = 0.005) that provided
good security for the side-channel attack tested in
Section 2.4.1 (see Figure 2.1b). Each query range
on the horizontal axis has two box-and-whiskers
plots, one for nearest and one for heuristic. The
three horizontal lines forming each box indicate
the first, second (median), and third quartiles, and the whiskers extend to cover all points within
1.5× the interquartile range. Outliers are indicated using plus (“+”) symbols. A different box-
and-whiskers plot is shown per 100-query block across the 200 runs (i.e., each boxplot represents
20,000 points) because the noise increases as the number of queries grows. The differences be-
tween the nearest and heuristic distributions are nearly imperceptible, and this trend holds for
other parameter and procfs fields we have explored, as well. That said, the heuristic solution
relies on hand-tuned algorithms and by default provides no guarantees, and so in cases where
the speed of computing the nearest solution is acceptable—the nearest solution took an average
of 8ms to return, whereas our heuristic approach completed in an average of 50µs—it might be
preferable.
Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 represent the relative error in readings of the drs field and of the
utime field from the /proc/<pid>/stat file, respectively, for various values of ε. The val-
ues of ε in Figure 2.3 were chosen to overlap those used in the security evaluation depicted
in Figure 2.1b. The ε values tested in Figure 2.4 were chosen based on our simulation of the
software-keyboard side-channel attack of Lin et al. [94], which we conducted on a Nexus 4 smart-
phone running Android 5.1 with kernel 3.4.0; based on this simulation, we estimated that ranging
ε over 1/2 ≤ ε ≤ 5 would result in curve similar to or better (with lower accuracy) than that
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ǫ = 0.005 ǫ = 0.01 ǫ = 0.02 ǫ = 0.04
Figure 2.3: Relative error for drs field under nearest invariant reestablishment

















ǫ = 1 ǫ = 2 ǫ = 4 ǫ = 5
Figure 2.4: Relative error for utime field under nearest invariant reestablishment
in Figure 2.1a.7 In the tests in Figure 2.4, the utime field was queried every 50ms while a video
game was running. These graphs suggest that the relative error is typically modest, e.g., with a
third quartile of < 15% in Figure 2.3 and < 30% in Figure 2.4, though outliers can be large.
2.4.2.2 Rank Accuracy of top
The utility top is used by Linux administrators for performance monitoring and diagnosis.
By reading procfs, top displays system information like memory and CPU usage of running
processes. The processes are ranked by top according to a chosen field. In this section, we evalu-
7Lin et al. reported querying the utime field of the software keyboard process every 100ms to detect its increase.
With very rapid typing, the utime field in our tests increased less than 3 (jiffies) per 100ms interval, on average.
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(d) ε = 0.04
Figure 2.5: Average rank accuracy based on RES field
ate the utility of dpprocfs by measuring the rank accuracy of top when run using dpprocfs
in place of the original procfs.
To measure the rank accuracy, we ran two top processes on one computer. These two top
processes were started at the same time and updated information with the same frequency (every
two seconds in our tests). The only difference was that one top process read from dpprocfs
(with heuristic invariant reestablishment), and the other read from procfs in its original form.
To control the test workload in each experiment, we ran a set of ten processes doing floating-
point computations continually during each test. The number of memory pages allocated by each
process to store its array of floats was scaled linearly across the ten processes: the first process
allocated an 80MB array, the next process allocated a 95MB array, and so on up to the tenth
process, which allocated a 215MB array. Similarly, the processes were configured with linearly
scaled nice values ranging from −19 (highest priority) through −1 (lowest).
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(d) ε = 5
Figure 2.6: Average rank accuracy based on %CPU field
Let R(k) and R′(k) be the set of top k processes displayed by the two top programs. The
top-k accuracy is defined as 1
k
|R(k) ∩ R′(k)|. Figure 2.5 shows the average rank accuracy for
various values of k when processes were ranked by the RES field. The RES field is read from
/proc/<pid>/statm, calculated as filePages+anonPages, and represents the physical memory
usage of the process. Figure 2.6 shows the average rank accuracy when processes were ranked by
the %CPU field, calculated as (utime[i]− utime[i− 1])/(uptime[i]− uptime[i− 1]).
Several observations from Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6 are worth noting. First, top retains
much of its ability to rank processes by these measures; e.g., even for the lowest values of ε
tested (Figure 2.5a and Figure 2.6a), the top-5 ranks remained roughly 80% correct on average
through the tests. Second, whereas the top-10 rank is generally more accurate than the top-1 rank
in Figure 2.5, the reverse is true in Figure 2.6. This occurs because while the memory usage of
the ten test processes was scaled linearly, our linear scaling of nice values caused the actual
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%CPU to drop off super-linearly. So, for example, the average difference in %CPU values for the
processes with nice values −19 and −18 was much larger than the average %CPU difference
between processes with nice values −3 and −1.
2.5 Discussion
Security limitations. Since we do not noise every kernel data-structure field that is used to
serve procfs queries, there remains the possibility that such fields might reveal information
about the true values of noised fields. This could occur either because the unprotected fields are
related to those noised fields by invariants that our techniques did not find (see Section 2.3.2) or
because those relationships are only statistical (but not invariant). It will therefore be necessary to
extend the scope of our protections to other fields as new procfs storage side-channel attacks
are discovered or, in the limit, that all kernel data-structures used to generate procfs contents
be protected. As additional fields are brought under the protections of dpprocfs, the invariants
that are reestablished on those values will need to be expanded appropriately.
Similarly, the value of ε used to protect a field might need to be updated as new attacks involv-
ing that field are discovered. As shown in Section 2.4.1, the value of ε may need to differ from
one field to another. The magnitude of ε needed for a field will be correlated with the variation
of that field and the number of queries over which protection needs to be provided, since as the
number of queries grow, presumably so might d∗ (between the actual field values and another
from which it should remain indistinguishable).
Utility limitations. As the number of procfs queries grows, the amount of noise added to
the kernel data-structure fields used to generate the procfs outputs grows (see Section 2.2.3
and Section 2.3.1). Although the amount of noise only grows logarithmically as the number of
queries grows, the malicious user can still make a lot of queries to decay the utility of procfs
outputs. To slow this decay, it may be necessary to rate-limit the queries that involve each field or
to limit the number of such queries from any one user.
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It is possible to provide a separate protection domain for each user. Under this design, a sep-
arate privfs struct is maintained per querying user for each procfs field (as suggested
in Section 2.3.1). Each user can have her own view of the noised procfs, and the decay of
her procfs outputs won’t affect other users’ usage of those outputs. However, colluding users
might be able to weaken the protection of dpprocfs.
It may eventually be necessary to “reset” the d∗-private mechanism associated with a field,
particularly for a field associated with a long-running process. If the “reset” window is long
enough to cover the duration of the sensitive event, this sensitive event can still be protected by
our d∗-private mechanism. Typical durations of sensitive events range from milliseconds to sec-
onds. For example, the duration of a keyboard typing event is less than a second and the duration
of a browser page-loading event is several seconds. The system administrator can choose a proper
“reset” window size according to the type of attacks faced by the system. The “reset” action can
also be triggered by restarting the process itself, since restarting a process also refreshes its asso-
ciated kernel data structures. (This is also beneficial for performance and reliability [47].)
Alternative solutions to procfs side channels. An alternative to adding noise in procfs
outputs is to isolate mutually distrusting processes into different namespaces so that they cannot
read each others’ private procfs files. For example, Linux containers8 isolate multiple appli-
cations from each other using PID namespaces in the kernel. While useful in hosting services
such as modern PaaS clouds, Linux containers are less suitable in personal computing environ-
ments (e.g., Android devices and desktop computers) since sharing between different software
applications are necessary in these single-user settings. Without a shared procfs, applications
that need accesses to these system statistics—e.g., most traffic- and system-monitoring apps on
Google Play, as well as the sysstat utilities9—will no longer work.
Another approach to defend against procfs side channels is to detect suspicious behaviors




frequency. Otherwise, they might miss the opportunity of capturing sensitive events. For example,
Memento [82] reads the data resident size of the browser process from procfs in a loop to
detect changes of that data field. This reading frequency is easily more than one thousand times
per second. In contrast, the top command updates once every three seconds in the default setting.
It is possible to set a threshold of procfs reading rate to differentiate malicious behaviors from
normal ones. Some previous work [169] implements such detection method to defend against
side channel attacks. Our d∗-private mechanism can be augmented with this frequency-based
detection method. The ε value can be reduced as the procfs reading rate increases so that it is
harder for the attackers to get useful information.
Extensions to other storage side channels. We believe our proposed method can be extended
to other storage side channels such as those associated with mobile sensors (e.g., [30, 100, 165,
31, 11, 104, 142]). However, it is unclear how adding noise, e.g., to smartphone gyroscopes, will
affect the usability of the apps that rely on their readings.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter we have reported on the design, implementation, and evaluation of dpprocfs,
a modification to the procfs pseudo file system that suppresses storage side channels. The in-
novations that are central to our design include: (i) framing the side-channel problem as one of
achieving d-privacy for continual data release, and defining an appropriate distance d∗ for in-
stantiating d-privacy for this scenario; (ii) generalizing a differentially private mechanism for
the continuous release of binary values to the d∗-privacy goal we set forth; (iii) recognition of
the systems difficulties that can arise when adding noise to procfs outputs, and an invariant
reestablishment framework to address those difficulties; and (iv) a working implementation of
dpprocfs, coupled with an evaluation that shows it can simultaneously defend against known
storage side-channel attacks while retaining the utility of procfs for monitoring and diagnosis.
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CHAPTER 3: POPSICL: MASKING SERVER IDENTIFIERS TO ENFORCE SERVER
ANONYMITY1
Monitoring of online activities is a fact of life for many users, be it by, e.g., an employer to
detect activity that is inconsistent with corporate policy or a government to monitor sites accessed
by its citizens. While encryption is a first line of defense against monitoring, many identifiers
(including the DNS names and IP addresses) still reveal the identity of the servers accessed by
users. Numerous techniques have thus been developed to support server-anonymous access, i.e.,
access to a server in a way that hides the server identity from a monitor. The socalled “hidden
service”, supported by Tor [55], is an example of a technology that enables server-anonymous
access.
The growth of large hosting infrastructures such as compute clouds and content distribution
networks (CDNs) has opened new opportunities for deploying server-anonymous systems (see
Section 3.1 for a discussion). Because these hosting platforms serve content from many tenant
servers, intermingling controversial server content or anonymizing proxies among them (i.e., as
other tenants) can make it more difficult or expensive for a monitor to disambiguate which tenant
server a client is accessing. The vast resources and connectivity available via these infrastructures
can also expand the capacity of server-anonymous systems. However, prior attempts (of which
we are aware) to leverage these infrastructures to support server anonymity have been designed
for an oblivious cloud operator that (at best) provides no specific support for server anonymity
(e.g., [28, 69]). Changes are thus typically hoisted onto the client users of these systems, who
often lack the permissions, trust, or know-how to do so.
In this chapter, we instead propose a design for server-anonymous communication to tenant
servers of a cloud that leverages support and cooperation of the cloud provider and, in doing so,
1This chapter is excerpted from previously published work [162]
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avoids requiring any changes to client software. Our central innovation to enable this capabil-
ity is a PoPSiCl (pronounced “popsicle”), a Personalized Pseudonym for a Server in the Cloud.
Specifically, a PoPSiCl is a domain name with the following properties: First, it is personalized:
A PoPSiCl can be used to access the tenant server only by the client for which the cloud gener-
ated it. Second, it is a pseudonym: A PoPSiCl is a persistent identifier that the client to whom it
is issued can use to access the server over time (e.g., by bookmarking it). Moreover, the cloud
protects the identity of the tenant server accessed using this PoPSiCl from an attacker who can
both observe the client’s communication with the cloud and probe the cloud as another client or
tenant server itself. Though the cloud is trusted in our design, note that today the cloud is already
typically trusted with knowing which users frequent a tenant server. Even if the user connects to
a tenant server using an anonymizing service such as Tor, the cloud can access any identifying
information the user provides to the tenant server, either intentionally (e.g., an email address) or
not (e.g., HTTP cookies or browser fingerprints [116, 118, 32]2). In such cases, our trust in the
cloud does not substantially increase the trusted computing base for user privacy.
A design goal for PoPSiCls is that they can be implemented by the cloud operator in a way
that is unobtrusive to their tenants or their tenants’ clients. Specifically, we demonstrate an imple-
mentation of PoPSiCls to support private TLS accesses to web servers in the cloud that has the
following features:
• Our implementation requires no changes to client-side software and works with all major
web browsers. This stands in contrast to most work on anonymous access to servers (see
Section 3.1) that requires the installation of proxies on client computers or the installation
of a custom browser (e.g., Tor). Requiring no changes to the client is important for users
who lack either the permissions needed to modify their client platforms (as an employee
using a company-owned computer might) or the willingness to do so (e.g., since even
security software is often riddled with vulnerabilities [129, 46, 139]).
2The Tor Browser tries to mitigate browser fingerprinting by restricting browser features, but this requires reacting to
new attacks as they are discovered [118, 32] and has an inevitable impact on usability.
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• The only changes in user experience for supporting use of PoPSiCls is the use of client-
side TLS certificates to support TLS connections, and a visit to a cloud-operated PoPSiCl
store to obtain a PoPSiCl and the client-side certificate for a tenant server prior to her first
(server-anonymous) access to that server.
• A tenant server requires some changes to its OS and, if the server is a web server, minimal
other changes that can be hidden within high-level web programming frameworks like
Ruby on Rails. So, these changes can be packaged either in a platform-as-a-service (PaaS)
cloud offering or a virtual machine (VM) image for deployment to an infrastructure-as-a-
service (IaaS) cloud, without imposing on web-content developers.
Supporting PoPSiCls does impose more substantially on cloud infrastructure, notably through
the establishment of the PoPSiCl store; in dynamic generation of switching rules to configure
software-defined networking (SDN) switches in the cloud infrastructure; and, as mentioned
above, in tenant server operating systems. We detail the changes needed to OpenStack and Linux
to implement the needed functionality. Our implementation therefore most directly reflects how
an IaaS cloud operator could deploy and support PoPSiCls, with OS modifications provided
through PoPSiCl-enabled virtual-machine images. We envision that a cloud operator might be
motivated to support PoPSiCls as one component of a larger “security as a service” offering,
charging tenant servers for PoPSiCl use, perhaps per PoPSiCl or even per PoPSiCl-based connec-
tion.
We have used CloudLab (https://www.cloudlab.us/) to characterize the performance
impact of PoPSiCl usage, versus regular (non-server-anonymous) web browsing over TLS. Our
results show that our design introduces modest overhead to server access latency and throughput,
and is capable of scaling to large numbers of users, should PoPSiCl use catch on. We also show
that the access latency of our implementation is considerably better than proxy-based systems
such as Tor, which also enhance privacy for server access, as discussed above. (We caution the
reader, however, that the threat model and protections offered by PoPSiCls are different than
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those for which systems like Tor were designed, as we will discuss in Section 3.1 and especially
Section 3.7.)
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. We provide background in Section 3.1, and
outline the principles behind our design in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 contains our high-level sys-
tem design, and Section 3.4 describes our current implementation. We evaluate that implementa-
tion in Section 3.5. In Section 3.6, we extend our design to address some forms of traffic analysis.
We discuss the limitations of our design in Section 3.7. Finally, we summarize this chapter in
Section 3.8.
3.1 Background
The goal of our design of PoPSiCls is to provide server anonymity (elsewhere called recipient
anonymity [126] or recipient untraceability [36]) against network attackers. That is, a network
attacker can observe that a client is initiating communication with a server in the cloud, but the
attacker is unable to determine the specific server with which the client is communicating. In this
context, a PoPSiCl is an implicit address [126] for a tenant server; moreover, it is visible in that
its reuse to reconnect to the server is evident—both to the cloud, which can use the PoPSiCl to
route the client to the physical machine currently hosting the tenant server, and to the attacker.
The servers that appear to the adversary to be the possible targets of the client (i.e., the server’s
anonymity set [36]) is the set of all tenant servers in the same cloud datacenter as the target.
The most widely used methods to achieve server anonymity today are based on proxying
(e.g., Tor [55], Psiphon (https://psiphon.ca/), and early versions of the Anonymizer [27])
or VPNs (such as the current Anonymizer, https://www.anonymizer.com/). Unlike these
systems, PoPSiCls are not supported in our design through proxying or VPN tunneling. In par-
ticular, communication to a PoPSiCl is encrypted by the client and decrypted only by the tenant
server in the cloud (vs. at a proxy or tunnel endpoint), leaving few opportunities for accidental
leakage. Moreover, as we will show, proxies can become performance bottlenecks, and so our
design scales better to heavy usage.
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Variations on the goal of server anonymity have been studied in several forms, often under
the rubric of censorship resistance. Like our design, several in this space leverage infrastructure
providers explicitly (clouds, CDNs, or ISPs) to hide the server with which a client is trying to
interact.
• In domain fronting [69], a client connects to a CDN edge server or reflector web applica-
tion run in the cloud via a front domain other than the hidden domain of actual interest. The
edge server or reflector then inspects the plaintext payload (e.g., the HTTP Host header)
to discover the hidden domain and retrieves it for the client. A PoPSiCl can be viewed as
a front domain, though the mapping to its hidden domain is maintained by the cloud op-
erator and managed without inspecting the client’s payload or, more to the point, without
decrypting it, which is better for client/tenant security.
• CacheBrowser [78] enables a website’s content to be retrieved from any CDN edge server
without a DNS resolution, leveraging the assumption that it is untenable for censors to
block IP addresses of CDN edge servers due to the collateral damage it would cause. How-
ever, this system still exposes the true server domain in the SNI field (see Section 3.2.1)
and so is not truly server-anonymous. Recent improvements [174] rectify this concern, but
do so in a way that is incompatible with some CDNs. In either case, these solutions work
only for cacheable content.
• CloudTransport [28] repurposes cloud storage to implement interactive communication to a
server in a way that will evade common censorship techniques.
• Telex [160] enables friendly on-path ISPs to recognize “tagged” traffic addressed to uncen-
sored websites and divert it to the censored websites for which it is really intended. Tag-
ging is implemented in the SSL handshake protocols, by embedding a tag into the random
value field in the ClientHello message.
• LAP [80], Dovetail [137], HORNET [37], and PHI [38] are network-layer protocols that
aim to provide low-latency and high-throughput anonymous communication. In these pro-
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tocols, the source and destination addresses are encrypted so that the intermediate routing
node only knows its adjacent nodes in the path (similar to Tor).
• There have been several proposals to host Tor relays in clouds [85, 109]. Moreover, sys-
tems like Tor have tended to be vulnerable to censors because users are connected to a
small set of entry points that can be blocked. So, prior works have proposed to reduce the
disclosure of IP addresses of Tor entry points through Tor bridges (a variation of keyspace
hopping [68]; see https://www.torproject.org/docs/bridges) and, through the
deployment of the Tor Cloud project (https://cloud.torproject.org/), to run Tor
bridges inside clouds.
As they relate to our work, all of the above approaches require modifying client-side software.
In contrast, our design requires no client-side software changes at all (albeit while requiring
changes to infrastructure, as many of the above designs also require). That said, we stress that in
contrast to some of the works above, our goal here is not censorship resistance, per se, but rather
server anonymity, as the assumption of a trustworthy and cooperative cloud is somewhat at odds
with the former. We discuss this issue further in Section 3.7.
3.2 Design Principles
In this section we detail the security (Section 3.2.1) and usability (Section 3.2.2) goals of our
system.
3.2.1 Security
Threat model. We begin our discussion of the security principles of our design by recalling our
threat model. A cloud hosts tenant servers, to which clients can connect (e.g., using TLS). As
is the case today, the cloud operator is trusted by both tenant servers and their clients. We are
concerned with enabling a client to connect to a tenant server without divulging to an attacker
the tenant server to which it is connecting. The client machine is trusted, as is the tenant server
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to which it connects. Other clients and other tenant servers are not trusted in the context of this
client-server interaction; i.e., the identity of the server to which the client connects should remain
hidden despite the efforts of other clients and other tenant servers. We also allow the attacker
to capture and manipulate all traffic outside the cloud premises, including traffic to or from the
client, but traffic within the cloud is invisible to the attacker (except if the attacker controls the
source or destination of the traffic).
Figure 3.1: In our threat model, the server iden-
tity can leak via the client’s DNS query, the SNI
field of the client-to-server TLS connection, the
server IP address, or the server public key
Our threat model gives the attacker many
opportunities to observe the identity of the ten-
ant server to which a client connects in today’s
clouds (see Figure 3.1). First, the DNS reso-
lution of the server domain name can reveal
that domain name to the attacker. Second, the
IP address to which the client connects will
be visible to the attacker; the attacker can then
connect to this IP address itself to see what
the server provides, or simply use this IP ad-
dress to determine the server’s identity from a
preassembled database (like a reverse DNS lookup). The connection process itself can offer addi-
tional opportunities for the attacker to identify the server; in particular, a TLS connection exposes
the server domain name in the Server Name Identification (SNI) field that the client sends, and in
the certificate that the server provides to the client. The certificate also exposes the server’s public
key, which can be matched against the public keys in certificates obtained by other clients.
We leave several types of attack outside our scope, relying on orthogonal defenses to address
them. For example, we assume the security of TLS and that the attacker can impersonate neither
any cloud-provided service or tenant server that it does not control (by virtue of not having the
needed server private key), nor any client that it does not control (by virtue of not having the
client private key).
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Also outside our scope are connection-level features that can divulge indications of the server
involved in the connection, such as have been used in TCP fingerprinting (e.g., [70]), TLS finger-
printing (e.g., [108]), or website fingerprinting (e.g., [65, 158, 122]). Such features include the
number of servers to which the client connects, the timing connections to relative to one another,
connection volume patterns, the direction of the connections, etc. That said, we have made initial
progress toward a framework for traffic-analysis defense, as we will discuss in Section 3.6.
Security principles. To achieve server anonymity in the threat model described above, several
steps are necessary. The first is to replace the server’s domain name with a different domain
name—the PoPSiCl—everywhere it is visible to the attacker. So, it will be necessary to cause
the PoPSiCl to be used in the client’s DNS lookup, the TLS SNI field, and the certificate that the
tenant server sends to the client. In our system, the PoPSiCl takes the form str.popsicls.com
where popsicls.com is the domain name of the cloud and str is a string that represents the
PoPSiCl prefix. So, for example, 1f5qz7nfhj1uworr7laduh9fen.popsicls.com might
be a PoPSiCl. Of course, the PoPSiCl prefix str must be generated for this client in a way that
prevents the attacker from correlating it with PoPSiCls generated for other clients to access the
same tenant server.
R1:The PoPSiCl for a client to access a tenant server is independent of the PoPSiCl generated
for other clients, and the PoPSiCl is used in place of the tenant server’s domain name every-
where that domain name appears in client communication.
The PoPSiCl is intended to be a long-lived identifier that the client can use to access the
server. To that end, the client uses the PoPSiCl just like any other domain name—by performing
a DNS lookup on it to obtain an IP address to which to address network packets. To prevent the
attacker from using this IP address to identify the server, however, the DNS resolution must pro-
duce a pseudo-address, which is a different IP address that the one the server actually uses. More
specifically, a pseudo-address is a publicly routable IP address that is part of the IP address block
allocated to the cloud, so that a packet addressed to the pseudo-address will eventually reach a
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switch in the cloud datacenter. However, the pseudo-address should be otherwise unrelated to the
actual IP address of the tenant server.
R2:The pseudo-address to which a client addresses packets for the tenant server (and from
which return packets arrive to this client) is independent from the actual network endpoint
(i.e., IP address) of the tenant server in the cloud.
A pseudo-address can be used in our system to establish a TLS connection to the tenant
server associated with the PoPSiCl. TLS connection establishment introduces other potential
identifiers that might be used to deanonymize the tenant server, particularly the public-key certifi-
cate for the server. As such, the tenant server should use a different public key per client.
R3:In a TLS connection setup with a client that is accessing the server using a PoPSiCl, the
tenant-server public key used was generated independently of the server public keys used in
its TLS connections with other clients (regardless of whether those clients use PoPSiCls to
access the server).
There remains the risk that the attacker who observes the pseudo-address could simply con-
nect to that pseudo-address itself and identify the server based on the content returned. To prevent
this possibility, the client for which the PoPSiCl was created should be the only one that can
complete a secure connection using it.
R4:A tenant server completes a TLS connection setup with a client using a PoPSiCl only if that
PoPSiCl was registered for use by that client, with this tenant server.
3.2.2 Usability
Here, usability refers to the operational impact of PoPSiCls on all actors in the cloud ecosystem—
the cloud operator, cloud tenants, and the tenant’s clients. The approach we take in our design
of a system to support PoPSiCls is to place a larger usability burden of deploying PoPSiCls on
those groups of actors with greater technical capabilities. Major cloud operators arguably offer
the highest concentration of technical capability, as their datacenter functioning is integral to all
tenants’ availability and security. As such, they will bear the greatest burden in supporting our
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design. Tenants who deploy servers to the cloud typically require at least a knowledge of how
to populate a server with content, and so we will limit our design to small modifications to that
process (at least in the case of web servers). Finally, we presume the tenants’ clients might be
driven by wholly nontechnical users (e.g., via web browsers) who might not have the permissions
needed to install software on their computers (e.g., as a user of a corporate-controlled computer
might not) or a willingness to do so (e.g., due to the vulnerabilities that such software can intro-
duce [129, 46, 139]). So, we place a priority on minimizing client-side changes.
Treating these groups in reverse order, then, our first requirement is that changes to clients be
very limited.
R5:PoPSiCls are usable with no changes to client-side software, including no browser exten-
sions or add-ons, in the case of web clients. While PoPSiCls are visible to clients and may
require some adaptation of client user procedures (in the case of typical web browsing, for
example), these adaptations are already supported by the dominant software clients in the
market.
The primary operational adaptations required by our design for a web user, for example,
are the following. First, our design involves the use of client authentication via a client-side
certificate in TLS. While not without its issues [123], support for client authentication is already
in all major browsers and is in use by large communities (e.g., in Estonia, due to its national PKI
initiative [123], and by MIT faculty, staff, and students to access some web services3). Second, a
user must take an additional, online step to obtain (“register”) a PoPSiCl for future accesses to a
website. We will describe PoPSiCl registration in Section 3.3.1.
For tenant servers, who might range from large, well-staffed organizations to small online
vendors, we allow changes to the software they use but require that those changes can be made
largely “invisible” to them, if they so choose.
R6:Changes to tenant servers can be hidden so that they do not impose on server content cre-
ation. For example, changes involving the tenant-server operating system (OS) or content-
3http://ist.mit.edu/certificates/guide
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programming frameworks can be packaged within a virtual-machine image that respects
existing application programming interfaces (APIs). As such, a tenant-server creator should
be able to “port” his content to this VM image with minimal effort.
Our design intrudes on tenant servers primarily by requiring specific OS-level changes, dis-
cussed in Section 3.3.2. These can be packaged within a VM for deployment to Infrastructure-
as-a-Service (IaaS) clouds. Alternatively, in a Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) cloud, the OS is
managed by the cloud operator, and so these changes would be invisible to the tenant server.
In addition, some defenses specific to HTTP servers described in Section 3.3.3 and an optional
extension described in Appendix 3.6 induce very minor additional changes to modern web pro-
gramming frameworks (such as Ruby on Rails).
We allow for our design to impact cloud operators more directly. Again, though, cloud opera-
tors are the most technically savvy and so presumably the most capable of accommodating such
changes.
3.3 Design
In this section we describe the design of a system to enable a cloud operator to implement
PoPSiCls for its tenants and their clients. In order to use a PoPSiCl to access a tenant server, a
client must first register the PoPSiCl, a process described in Section 3.3.1. The mechanisms sup-
porting the use of a PoPSiCl to connect to a tenant server are described in Section 3.3.2. Adapta-
tions specific to supporting HTTP clients using PoPSiCls are described in Section 3.3.3. Finally,
how our design achieves the requirements laid out in Section 3.2 is the topic of Section 3.3.4.
3.3.1 Registering a PoPSiCl
The registration of a PoPSiCl is a user-initiated process, involving connecting to a particular
cloud-operated service, the PoPSiCl store, using a web browser. The connection should employ
TLS, though need not require a password login or any other form of client authentication. Rather,
TLS is employed here simply to protect the privacy of the user. Upon accessing the PoPSiCl
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(a) Registration, described in Section 3.3.1 (b) Access, described in Section 3.3.2
Figure 3.2: Steps for registering a PoPSiCl (Figure 3.2a) and then using it (Figure 3.2b)
store, the user is presented with a web form to indicate the domain name, say tenantA.com,
for which she wishes to register a PoPSiCl. Since we are trusting the cloud operator, we assume
that if tenantA.com is not, in fact, hosted by the cloud, then it will decline the registration.
If tenantA.com is one of its tenants, then the PoPSiCl store takes the following actions
(see Figure 3.2a).
(i) The PoPSiCl store first creates a new PoPSiCl for tenantA.com, of the form str.po
psicls.com, where str denotes a string of characters allowed in domain names. It then
creates and exports a DNS record for str.popsicls.com that maps this PoPSiCl to
one or more publicly routable IP addresses in the address ranges allocated to popsic
ls.com, to which we refer as pseudo-addresses. As we will see in Section 3.3.2, these
pseudo-addresses are addresses of SDN controllers in the same datacenter (region) as
tenantA.com. The PoPSiCl store also informs these SDN controllers that this PoPSiCl
corresponds to tenantA.com.
(ii) The PoPSiCl store creates a new public/private keypair for use by tenantA.com and
binds the public key to str.popsicls.com in a TLS server certificate signed by the PoP-
SiCl store. The PoPSiCl store delivers this private key and server certificate to the tenant
server. It also delivers to the tenant server a root certificate for authenticating client cer-
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tificates in TLS connection attempts to str.popsicls.com. For our purposes, it suffices
for the newly generated server certificate to be used as this root certificate, as well. (Al-
ternatively, a different root certificate generated for this specific purpose could be used.)
This step assumes a tenant server capable of receiving this information. As described in
Section 3.4, the Nginx web server already supports this capability, for example.
(iii) The PoPSiCl store generates a public/private keypair for the client to use to authenticate
itself when connecting to str.popsicls.com; creates a certificate for this public key that
can be verified using the root certificate of Step (ii); and returns the private key, public-key
certificate, and PoPSiCl to the user. The user then saves this information and takes whatever
steps are necessary to permit its TLS client to make use of this key when connecting to
str.popsicls.com. For example, if the client is a web browser, then the client might
bookmark the PoPSiCl and import this key pair and certificate into the browser. This step is
already supported by major browsers.
Prior to connecting to str.popsicls.com, the client must also be configured with the PoP-
SiCl store as a certificate authority (CA) for TLS server certificates. In this way, the client will
accept the tenant server’s certificate (see Step (ii)) during TLS connection setup.
A user’s first (or any) connection to the PoPSiCl store could be used to obtain a PoPSiCl
for the PoPSiCl store, so that subsequent accesses to the PoPSiCl store can be hidden from an
attacker.
3.3.2 Connection Establishment
Via the steps described in Section 3.3.1, the client is in possession of a PoPSiCl for the server
to which it wants to connect. To connect to this server, the client performs a DNS lookup on
the PoPSiCl, as it would any other server domain name (steps 1–2 in Figure 3.2b). Because the
PoPSiCl is of the form str.popsicls.com where popsicls.com is the cloud domain name,
the cloud ultimately provides the IP address returned to this DNS query. The IP address provided
by the cloud is not the actual IP address of the machine hosting the tenant server (this would
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violate R2), but rather must be independent of it. One option would be to return the IP address
of a (reverse) proxy in the cloud that relays client requests to the tenant server associated with
the PoPSiCl (and responses back to the client); this design has similar security properties to ours,
but as we will see in Section 3.5.2, this proxy will become a bottleneck. Rather, in our design,
the DNS query is resolved to a publicly routable IP address of an SDN controller in the same
datacenter (region) as the tenant server corresponding to str.popsicls.com; we refer to this IP
address as a pseudo-address for the tenant server.
Let the pseudo-address be denoted by pseudo-IP, and let client-IP and client-port denote the
source IP address and source port of the first packet that the client sends to pseudo-IP (a TCP
SYN), when it arrives at the cloud switch (step 3 in Figure 3.2b). client-IP and client-port need
not be the actual IP address and port of the client; rather, these could instead be the address and
port of a network-address translator (NAT) or proxy between the client and the cloud. Unless it
has a higher-priority rule (see below) that matches specifically this source IP address (client-IP),
source port (client-port), destination address (pseudo-IP), and destination port (denoted server-
port), the switch forwards the packet using the default routing rule for this destination (pseudo-
IP). Since in our design, the pseudo-IP is set to an IP address of the SDN switch controller in the
cloud datacenter, this TCP SYN packet is forwarded to the controller (step 4 in Figure 3.2b). In
this case, the controller responds with a TCP SYN-ACK and completes the TCP connection with
the client (step 5 in Figure 3.2b).
After completing the TCP connection, the client then launches the TLS handshake. At this
point, the controller learns str.popsicls.com from the ClientHello SNI field, with which
it can look up the tenant server to which this PoPSiCl corresponds, say with IP address tenant-
IP. The controller then takes the following steps (without responding with a ServerHello
message), in order:
(i) The controller installs two new rules in the switch (step 6 in Figure 3.2b). One matches
packets with source address client-IP, source port client-port, destination address pseudo-
IP, and destination port server-port; this rule simply drops any such packet silently. The
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second matches packets with source address tenant-IP, source port server-port, destination
address client-IP, and destination port client-port; changes the source address to pseudo-IP;
and forwards the packet toward client-IP.4 These rules have higher priority than any other
rules that apply to the same packets.
(ii) The controller then transfers the TCP connection state to the tenant server OS (step 7 in
Figure 3.2b), including the buffer containing the ClientHello, and so the tenant server
picks up the TCP session where the controller left off (by responding with a ServerHello).
Our implementation of TCP connection transfer uses the technique in the tcpcp tool [8].
(iii) The controller then replaces the drop rule installed in Step (i) above (i.e., matching packets
with source address client-IP, source port client-port, destination address pseudo-IP, and
destination port server-port) to instead change the destination address of any matching
packet to tenant-IP and then to forward the packet toward tenant-IP (step 8 in Figure 3.2b).
The TLS connection establishment that the tenant server continues with the client requires the
client to present a client certificate that can be verified by the server certificate for this PoPSiCl
(step 9 in Figure 3.2b). The tenant server received the server certificate for this PoPSiCl, and the
client received this matching client certificate, in the PoPSiCl registration process (Section 3.3.1).
If this client certificate is not sent, then the TLS connection fails; otherwise, the TLS connection
can be established and communication proceeds as normal (step 10 in Figure 3.2b).
The above ordering of steps is chosen purposely. The drop rule is installed in Step (i) to drop
any inbound messages from the client during the TCP state transfer, which could confuse the
transfer process. The other rule in Step (i) is installed to ensure that the ServerHello and the
following messages sent by the tenant server in Step (ii), when the TCP state transfer completes,
are forwarded to the client with the pseudo-IP as their source addresses. The controller replaces
the drop rule from Step (i) as described in Step (iii) to permit the connection between the client
and tenant server to continue. Of course, it is possible that the controller does not finish Step (iii)
4The installation of this second rule assumes that return packets traverse this same switch. If they do not, then this
second rule would need to be inserted into another switch that they will traverse.
54
before the client sends another message, in which case the drop rule from Step (i) will drop it. We
leverage TCP’s retransmission capabilities to overcome any such drops that occur.
A possible denial-of-service attack against our architecture is to overwhelm the SDN con-
troller(s), which will handle all TCP connections established using PoPSiCls until they are
handed off to their tenant servers. For this reason, the controllers must be defended using state-
of-the-art denial-of-service defenses. That said, note that our design allows for multiple SDN
controllers and switches, and load-balancing among them. We could allocate a pool of servers
hosting SDN controllers and increase the number of serving controllers as the load increases.
3.3.3 HTTP-specific Mechanisms
PoPSiCls can be used to support any type of server accessed using TLS. Overwhelmingly,
however, the most common example today is HTTP, and so in this section we address several
issues specific to their use to support access to HTTP servers.
Same-origin policy and cookies. Our architecture for supporting PoPSiCls permits the browser
to accurately track origins, i.e., to support its same origin policy [133], since the browser is pro-
vided a unique domain name (the PoPSiCl) per tenant domain. This same property also enables
the browser to send cookies to (only) the right domains—avoiding a pitfall of some previous
anonymous communication systems (e.g., early versions of the Anonymizer [27]). To prohibit
tenants from setting cookies for the cloud domain (e.g., popsicls.com), the cloud operator
should add popsicls.com to the public suffix list5, just as is, e.g., amazonaws.com today.
Object hyperlinking. When a tenant web server accessed using a PoPSiCl serves hyperlinks to
its own objects, their URLs should leverage the PoPSiCl as their domain name. Otherwise, the
browser would retrieve these objects using a URL with a different domain name, causing them
to be viewed by the browser as coming from a different origin. This could cause the web page to
malfunction, or it could result in disclosure of the true domain name to an attacker. Fortunately,
this is achieved easily by hyperlinking to relative URLs, or by authoring web content with the
5https://publicsuffix.org/
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domain name inserted by a macro that is resolved to the PoPSiCl with which the current client is
accessing the server.
Hyperlinking between servers requires additional attention, since one server should not learn
the PoPSiCl that a client uses to access another server. First, to ensure that a client browser
does not disclose the PoPSiCl that it uses for accessing a tenant server, say tenantA.com,
to another server to which tenantA.com refers the client (i.e., in the HTTP Referer field),
tenantA.com should set the referrer policy of its referring page to no-referrer or
same-origin.6 Second, to allow referrals to a tenant server, say tenantB.com, without
disclosing the server’s identity to our attacker, the cloud operator popsicls.com can support
hyperlinking to it using a URL such as https://linker.popsicls.com?tenantB.com/
..., where linker.popsicls.com is a cloud-operated server. Upon receiving the TLS con-
nection from the client, linker.popsicls.com can look up the PoPSiCl that this client uses
to access tenantB.com (authenticating the client using its client certificate) and then redi-
rect the client browser to that PoPSiCl. (For reasons discussed below, however, linker.pop
sicls.com will have to apply additional policy before doing so.) If no such PoPSiCl exists,
then linker.popsicls.com can simply redirect the client to tenantB.com. To support
hyperlinking in this fashion, the PoPSiCl store should provide a client-side certificate and ac-
companying private key for the client to use to connect to linker.popsicls.com, during the
client’s first PoPSiCl registration (for a web server) at the PoPSiCl store.
Cross-origin attacks in browsers. A tenant server accessed using a PoPSiCl does not complete
a TLS connection setup with a client other than the one that registered that PoPSiCl. An attacker
who obtains a PoPSiCl in use by a client, say 1f5...fen.popsicls.com, is thus unable to con-
nect to it directly in an effort to retrieve content from it (and thereby deanonymize it). Through
cross-origin side channels, however, the attacker could potentially infer the true server identity
behind a PoPSiCl. For example, the attacker could set up a web server (not necessarily in the
6See https://www.w3.org/TR/referrer-policy/. As of this writing, the latest versions of Edge and Safari
support an older draft of the referrer-policy specification, for which the referring policy should be set to never.
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cloud) and, if it could convince the client browser to visit its server, could serve back to the client
a hyperlink, say https://1f5...fen.popsicls.com/path, that uses the PoPSiCl as its do-
main name. An attacker script could then test if the browser successfully retrieved the object at
this URL,7 thereby inferring whether path is a valid path at the tenant server. Since this might be
a distinctive pathname, the attacker could deanonymize the server this way.
To prevent such cross-origin attacks, the tenant server refuses requests for URLs containing
the PoPSiCl 1f5...fen.popsicls.com except from its own pages or via redirections from li
nker.popsicls.com. The tenant server enforces this property by requiring any URL utilizing
1f5...fen.popsicls.com to be appended with a capability, specific to this PoPSiCl, that only
itself and linker.popsicls.com can obtain. This capability is implemented as a random,
unguessable string that must be encoded as a query string in any URL using 1f5...fen.popsic
ls.com, so that it is always transmitted under TLS protection. It is created by the PoPSiCl store
when 1f5...fen.popsicls.com is first registered and is returned in the URL that the user is
invited to bookmark. Both the tenant server and linker.popsicls.com are then permitted
to retrieve the capability (from a cloud-operated database) when needed, for the purposes of
producing URLs containing that PoPSiCl.
There remains a cross-origin attack that a web server with which the client is interacting
can mount, to infer the PoPSiCl the client uses to contact a tenant server, say tenantA.com,
provided that the adversary controlling the web server can simultaneously monitor the traf-
fic from the client to the cloud. If the web server directs the client to retrieve https://li
nker.popsicls.com?tenantA.com/... and then monitors traffic for an interaction with
linker.popsicls.com and then a connection using a PoPSiCl in close temporal proximity,
then the attacker can infer that the client uses this PoPSiCl for tenantA.com. Fortunately,
the intervening interaction with the trusted linker.popsicls.com provides an opportu-
nity to mitigate this attack. For example, a reasonable policy might be for linker.popsicl
s.com to redirect the request to https://linker.popsicls.com?tenantA.com/...
7There are many ways to perform this test, e.g., by hyperlinking to an image and then testing the height of the image,
which would typically differ depending on whether the image retrieval succeeded or failed.
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to one that uses the client’s PoPSiCl for tenantA.com only if the referrer site is trusted by
tenantA.com and the client is also accessing the referrer site using a PoPSiCl. (Otherwise,
linker.popsicls.com redirects the client to tenantA.com, sans PoPSiCl.) The referrer
site can indicate compliance with this last condition to linker.popsicls.com by, say, ap-
pending the client’s capability for the referring site to the referral https://linker.popsi
cls.com?tenantA.com/..., which linker.popsicls.com can check by looking up the
capability and corresponding referrer in a database.
3.3.4 Design Principles, Revisited
In this section we revisit the principles outlined in Section 3.2 to describe how our design
achieves them.
Security. Requirement R1 is met by having the PoPSiCl store generate each PoPSiCl (specif-
ically, the str part of str.popsicls.com) pseudorandomly. The tenant server to which this
PoPSiCl corresponds is protected during the registration process by TLS (Section 3.3.1) and
thereafter is accessible only to the cloud’s SDN controller(s) (Section 3.3.2) in order to route con-
nection traffic appropriately (and the tenant server itself, of course). The PoPSiCl is used by the
client as any other domain name would be, and so it appears everywhere that the domain name
would in the normal course of client communication—notably in DNS queries, the TLS SNI field,
and the server TLS certificate.
Requirement R2 is met by having the cloud’s DNS server resolve the PoPSiCl to an IP ad-
dress of an SDN controller in the datacenter hosting the corresponding tenant server. This reveals
the datacenter (region) in which the tenant resides, but nothing else.
Requirement R3 is met in a manner similar to that for R1, i.e., by the PoPSiCl store gener-
ating a new public key (and public-key certificate) for the tenant server per client who registers
a PoPSiCl for that server. This certificate is then provided to the tenant server for use in TLS
connection setups when accessed using the corresponding PoPSiCl.
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Finally, requirement R4 is met because the tenant server will accept a TLS connection to a
PoPSiCl only from the client that registered it. Additionally, in the case of HTTP traffic, cross-
origin attacks to indirectly query a PoPSiCl are prevented through refusing requests for URLs
containing the PoPSiCl unless those URLs are appended with the PoPSiCl-specific capability that
only the tenant server or linker.popsicls.com can obtain (Section 3.3.3).
Usability. Registration to obtain a PoPSiCl for a server is the only per-server procedure that a
user must perform. In this step, the user visits a cloud-run website via HTTPS and enters the web
server domain of interest. In return, it receives a PoPSiCl and a file containing a client public-
key certificate and corresponding private key for use in TLS connections using this PoPSiCl.
How the user employs this data is client-specific, but for a modern web browser, it might involve
creating a bookmark using the PoPSiCl and importing the client certificate and private key into
the browser. As such, we believe that our design meets requirement R5. It should also be noted
that to register a PoPSiCl for a server, a user needs to learn that the server is hosted in the cloud.
This point is discussed further in Section 3.7.
Changes to tenant servers are as follows. A tenant server OS must be modified to support
the receipt of TCP connection states from the SDN controllers in the cloud (Section 3.3.2), and
a tenant server also needs to be modified to refuse any connection using a PoPSiCl except from
the client who registered it. A tenant web server must also check any URL using a PoPSiCl
for the corresponding capability, as discussed in Section 3.3.3, to prevent cross-origin request
forgeries that might deanonymize the PoPSiCl. Finally, the hyperlinks in the server’s content
must be changed to use relative URLs (for content at the same site) or the cloud-operated linker
service (for content at another site), and the tenant server must set its referrer policy appropriately
(Section 3.3.3). As discussed below, these changes can be introduced within VMs (or by a PaaS
cloud operator) in such a way that content programming APIs need not be altered. We thus argue
that requirement R6 is also met.
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3.4 Implementation
We realized our design in an OpenStack8-based IaaS cloud on top of the CloudLab9 testbed.
Each cloud computing node supports one or more tenant virtual machines (VMs) using the KVM
hypervisor10. All tenant VMs are connected to the cloud network via Open vSwitch [125]. Open
vSwitch is a software switch that runs in each hypervisor and bridges the virtual network inter-
faces of VMs on multiple computing nodes to a single layer-two network. Besides normal layer-
two switching, Open vSwitch can be integrated with SDN controllers to support dynamic rule
deployment and packet rewriting. Although our system is built upon OpenStack, KVM and Open
vSwitch, we believe that our design could also integrate easily with other cloud implementations,
such as Amazon EC2.
Below we detail our implementation of the three major components in our design: the PoP-
SiCl store, the SDN controller, and tenant web servers. In addition, a video demonstration of the
user experience for our prototype can be found at http://www.cs.unc.edu/˜qiuyu/popsi
cl/.
3.4.1 PoPSiCl Store
PoPSiCl store is implemented on one of the web servers that are controlled by the cloud op-
erator. Its frontend is a regular HTTPS web server offering a web interface for browsers, which
accepts registration requests from any client browser. The backend of PoPSiCl store is imple-
mented as a native component (400 lines of C++ code) that interacts with the frontend using a
FastCGI protocol. Upon receiving a registration request, the frontend passes the request to the
backend to complete the registration process.
Generating PoPSiCl and pseudo-address. The PoPSiCl store backend generates a PoPSiCl for





domain-name format requirements [107], and so the PoPSiCl takes the form str.popsicls.c
om where popsicls.com is the domain name of the cloud. The PoPSiCl store also chooses a
pseudo-address for the PoPSiCl uniformly at random from a block of addresses for cloud SDN
controller(s). Uniqueness is not required for the pseudo-address; different PoPSiCls may be
associated with the same pseudo-address.
Generating certificates. The PoPSiCl store generates an X.509 server certificate SvrCert
for the tenant server for which the client is registering a PoPSiCl, and an X.509 client certificate
ClntCert for the client. In SvrCert, the issuer is the cloud operator, popsicls.com; the
subject name is the generated PoPSiCl; and the public key comes from a key pair (2048-bit RSA)
that is newly generated by the PoPSiCl store using OpenSSL11. SvrCert is signed by the cloud
operator’s private key, and so a chain of trust can be established when the cloud’s certificate is
trusted. (To do so, the cloud operator must first obtain a CA certificate that authorizes its private
key to sign new certificates.) The issuer of ClntCert is the PoPSiCl and the subject name is a
unique string that is derived from the PoPSiCl. The PoPSiCl store generates another RSA key
pair for the ClntCert and signs the ClntCert using the private key that was created for the
tenant server, so that trust in the SvrCert can be extended to ClntCert. The PoPSiCl store
bundles each certificate and its corresponding private key into a single PKCS#12 format file.
Distributing registration data. The PoPSiCl store distributes registration data to parties as fol-
lows: It sends the PoPSiCl and the pseudo-address to the cloud DNS server (which stores them
as a DNS record); the PoPSiCl and the domain name of the tenant server to the SDN controller;
SvrCert and the corresponding private key to the tenant server; and the PoPSiCl (or to sup-
port HTTP access, a URL containing the PoPSiCl and a capability for it, embedded as a query




3.4.2 Cloud SDN Controller
In our implementation, all Open vSwitch instances are managed by the same SDN controller,
a vSwitch controller we implemented in about 600 lines of C code. The SDN controller uses
ovs-ofctl12, a Linux command-line tool, to install and remove rules in each Open vSwitch.
As discussed in Section 3.3.2, every new TCP connection request using a PoPSiCl will be
directed to the SDN controller, which completes the TCP handshake and then, after receiving
a ClientHello message, hands off the TCP connection to the tenant server. To seamlessly
transfer the TCP state from the SDN controller to the tenant server, our system uses a custom
kernel extension (i.e., a kernel driver) to the Linux kernel (v4.2.0) to create a new user-kernel
interface on both the SDN controller and each tenant VM. Userspace programs can exploit this
interface (through ioctl system calls) to query or make changes to the internal TCP states.
To facilitate TCP state migration, we also developed a userspace library that enables the SDN
controller to obtain a copy of the TCP state information (sequence number, acknowledgment
number, etc.) for a specific Linux socket descriptor. The state information is then sent through a
long-lived TCP connection to the tenant server, which uses our helper library to create a new TCP
socket with the specified TCP state and then resume the TCP session.
3.4.3 Tenant HTTP Server
Key to our tenant web-server implementation is the support of virtual hosts—or “server
blocks” in Nginx, on which we base our implementation. A virtual host is a website implemented
by a single web server; importantly, one web server can implement multiple virtual hosts. In our
implementation, each virtual host corresponds to a PoPSiCl and thus a client of the website.
Upon PoPSiCl registration, the tenant web server receives the registration data for the client
(i.e., the PoPSiCl, the server certificate, and the corresponding private key) from the PoPSiCl
store. The configuration file of the Nginx web server is updated automatically to reflect these
registration data: a server block is added to the configuration file, with its server name direc-
12http://openvswitch.org/support/dist-docs/ovs-ofctl.8.txt
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tive set to be the PoPSiCl and the server certificate and server certificate key
directives set as the file-system paths of the server certificate and private key, respectively. The
server client certificate is set to be the path of the server certificate, as well, so that
the virtual server to be created accepts only connections from clients who possess a certificate
signed by the server’s private key (see Section 3.4.1). Nginx supports server reconfiguration on-
the-fly, and so a new virtual server for the PoPSiCl is created with the updated configuration file
without any server down time.
We also adapted the Ruby on Rails web-content development framework (v2.2.2) to defend
the cross-origin attack (see Section 3.3.3). Several macros, including stylesheet_link_
tag, javascript_include_tag, and link to, were modified to append the capability
query string to same-origin URLs constructed via these macros. For each incoming HTTP re-
quest, the Ruby on Rails framework first checks for the capability query string. If the validation
fails, a 404 error is returned.
3.5 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the impact of our design on performance of server interactions.
More specifically, the goals of our evaluation are to demonstrate the impact of PoPSiCls on
server-access latencies and throughputs, as well as the scalability of our design.
Our PoPSiCl-enabled OpenStack cloud was deployed in the CloudLab Wisconsin data cen-
ter. For most experiments, we configured our cloud with three physical nodes: one for running
OpenStack services (including DNS); one for running the PoPSiCl store and SDN controller; and
another for running a tenant web server in a virtual machine. All nodes ran an Open vSwitch,
though all rule installations described in Section 3.3.2 occurred on the controller machine. Each
physical node was equipped with two Intel E5-2630 v3 8-core 2.40GHz CPUs, 128GiB of mem-
ory, and a Dual-port Intel X520-DA2 10Gb NIC. The web client was running on a desktop lo-
cated in the UNC-Chapel Hill network. One experiment that compares our design with a proxy-
based design has different settings, as will be discussed later.
63
3.5.1 Performance
In this section, we discuss the performance of our PoPSiCl implementation. We primarily
compare to the performance of HTTPS alone (with no PoPSiCl and no client authentication) and,
in one experiment, the performance of Tor. We caution the reader that our comparison with Tor
is only somewhat fair: While Tor also provides server anonymity (a socalled “hidden service”),
it does so against stronger adversaries than our design does; e.g., our design reveals the cloud
datacenter within which a tenant server resides (Tor would hide this information) and additionally
provides client-server unlinkability [126], to an extent. Still, we compare to Tor because it is the
most widely used anonymous communication system today.
Web object download latency. In our first experiment, we measured the latency of download-
ing web objects. We chose Firefox as the web client for evaluating HTTPS and PoPSiCls, and the
latest Tor browser (v5.5.5) for evaluating Tor. To fairly measure the extra overhead introduced by
PoPSiCls, we restarted the web browser for each test, and so every web access was made through
a new TCP and TLS connection, including the overheads of TLS client certificate authentication
and TCP session hand-off from the SDN controller to the tenant server. We also restarted the
browser between accesses when testing HTTPS. For the Tor browser, we measured the access
latency after the Tor circuit had been built. We repeated the experiment 50 times per web-object
size, which varied from 1KiB to 5MiB.
Average access latencies per object size are shown in Figure 3.3a. As is clear from Figure 3.3a,
access using PoPSiCls is minimally more expensive than using HTTPS with no client authenti-
cation, and is roughly 2.5–4× more efficient than accessing content using Tor. Moreover, the
standard deviation of download latency for Tor is very considerable, indicating that for some Tor
downloads, latencies were even worse than 4× more expensive.
The latency of web-object retrieval using PoPSiCls is robust as the request rate grows. For
example, the average latency for retrieving a 10KiB object increases to 404ms when it is re-
quested at a rate of 200 requests per second from distinct clients (not shown), an increase of
less than 20% over the corresponding latency in Figure 3.3a. Latency is also relatively unaf-
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(a) Latency (b) Throughput
Figure 3.3: Performance of PoPSiCl access
fected by cross-site hyperlinking (see Section 3.3.3), especially for larger objects: accessing
linker.popsicls.com involves another HTTPS connection but none of the mechanism in
Section 3.3.2, and is unaffected by the retrieved objects’ size. So, for example, the latency of
retrieving a 1MiB object via linker.popsicls.com (not shown) is less than 11% larger than
when retrieving it using a PoPSiCl directly.
Web access throughput. In this experiment, we measured the throughput of the web server.
We used httperf13, a popular web server benchmark tool, to measure the throughput. httperf can
be used to dictate the rate of TCP requests and the number of HTTP requests per TCP connec-
tion, and it then will report the corresponding HTTP response rate. In our experiment, we mea-
sured and compared the server throughput when the server provides web access through HTTPS,
HTTPS with client authentication, or a PoPSiCl. We scaled the request rate from 50 requests/s
to 600 requests/s, with one HTTP request/response pair per TCP connection. The size of the re-
quested web object was 1KiB. For each request rate and each condition, we took 10 samples of
the response rate and calculated their mean.
As can be seen from Figure 3.3b, before the web server reached its sustainable throughput,
its response rate kept pace with the request rate. After the web server reached its limit, the re-
13http://www.labs.hpe.com/research/linux/httperf/
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sponse rate dropped as the request rate increased further. The maximum throughputs of HTTPS,
HTTPS with client authentication, and PoPSiCl were 490.5, 450.9, and 325.8 responses/s, respec-
tively. Compared with HTTPS, PoPSiCl induced a 33.5% throughput decrease. The throughput
bottleneck in these tests was the switch rule installation procedure (see Section 3.3.2), which
increasingly encountered failures when the request rate grew.
3.5.2 Scalability
Our design poses several potential scalability pitfalls. In this section we evaluate these ele-
ments of our design.
SDN rule installation and TCP handoff. As discussed in Section 3.3.2, our design results in
the installation of two rules per PoPSiCl-based TCP connection through a switch (or one rule
into each of two switches), followed by the transfer of TCP state from the SDN controller to
the tenant server and then the adjustment of one of the rules previously installed for this connec-
tion. These steps slow the connection setup to a tenant server, and so in our first experiment we
evaluated the impact of these overheads, as the number of concurrent connection setups grows.
We used cURL (https://curl.haxx.se/) as the web client for both HTTPS and PoPSiCl
access. In each test, we launched concurrent cURL processes; each process opened a connection
(HTTPS in one type of test, or using a PoPSiCl in the other type), retrieved a web object from
the tenant server, and then terminated its connection. We measured the completion time of all
connections, and plotted this completion time as a function of the number of processes (and
connections) launched. The size of the web object in this experiment was 10KiB.
Figure 3.4a shows the result of these experiments, where each point is the average of the re-
sults from ten runs. As can be seen there, the completion time for the PoPSiCl-based connections
was at most 1.4× the completion time for the same number of concurrent HTTPS connections.
Our SDN controller and tenant web server implementations already perform the steps for each
connection concurrently, though otherwise the implementations are relatively unoptimized.
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(a) Concurrent connections (b) Per-connection volume
Figure 3.4: Scalability of PoPSiCl access along several dimensions
The need for TCP handoff. The motivation for SDN rule installation and TCP handoff steps
detailed in Section 3.3.2 and evaluated above becomes evident when comparing our design to a
proxy-based alternative. In this alternative, each PoPSiCl is resolved to a pseudo-IP that is the
address of a proxy that completes the TCP connection with the client and then learns which ten-
ant server the client wants to contact from the ClientHello SNI field (like our SDN controller
does). The proxy then opens another TCP connection with the tenant server and relays traffic
between the client and server, without handing off that connection to the server.
We built this proxy alternative and evaluated its throughput. The proxy was implemented
in C with the UNIX socket API as a multithreaded application. When a new TCP connection is
initiated by the client, the proxy spawns a new thread, accepts this connection, and establishes
a TCP connection with the tenant server to relay packets. To ensure that the clients and servers
were not bottlenecks, we set up three httperf clients connecting to three tenant web servers, each
on its own physical node. As can be seen in Figure 3.4b, the proxy alternative outperformed ours
when the retrieved web object was small. But as the web-object size increased, the maximum
throughput of the proxy decayed dramatically. In contrast, the maximum throughput of PoPSiCl
stayed the same as the web-object size increased. The throughput of PoPSiCl is more stable
because each packet only makes the SDN switch rewrite the IP address field. However, each
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packet makes the proxy copy packet content from one socket to another socket and each TCP
connection costs extra resources to maintain TCP states. Aurelius et al. [10] found that 70% of
Flash video flows from various services transferred at least 1MiB data. If such streaming services
were deployed in the cloud, a proxy could be easily saturated.
SDN switch rules. By default, one million rules can be installed simultaneously in a vSwitch,
which would thus accommodate up to a half million concurrent client TCP connections in sup-
port of PoPSiCl-based server accesses. This introduces two scalability concerns.
First, since some clients (notably browsers) tend to open multiple connections per server
access, a vSwitch’s default rule capacity might accommodate far fewer than a half million con-
current clients using PoPSiCls. Statistics from a commercial multi-tenant data center shows that
50% of the hypervisors had mean flow counts of 107 or less [125]. Our use cases certainly re-
quire more rules. However, this concern can be addressed by increasing the rule capacity of a
vSwitch and also load-balancing rule installation across the potentially multiple vSwitches that
a client’s connections traverse. Indeed, additional vSwitches could be added in the cloud—even
elastically—to boost rule capacity, if needed.
Second, deploying several hundred thousand rules to a vSwitch could slow the process by
which the vSwitch matches incoming packets to rules, and so we conducted experiments to eval-
uate this performance degradation. Figure 3.5a shows the average latency (over 200 trials) suf-
fered by a client using a PoPSiCl to open a connection and retrieve an object of either 10KiB
or 100KiB from a tenant web server, when the switch starts with the number of rules indicated
on the horizontal axis. The performance clearly shows two “levels” of latency per object size.
The latency jumps to another level after the number of rules exceeds 200000. The reason is that
Open vSwitch uses a kernel cache to store the switching rules and the cache size is 200000 [125].
Nevertheless, the performance impact with nearly 1000000 rules is less than 2×. It is conceivable
that engineering a switch specifically to accommodate the usage that our design imposes might
further reduce this degradation.
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(a) Open vSwitch rules (b) Virtual hosts
Figure 3.5: Scalability of PoPSiCl access along several dimensions
Virtual hosts. As discussed in Section 3.4.3, our implementation deploys a virtual host to a
tenant web server per client that registers a PoPSiCl for it. This virtual host is associated with
the PoPSiCl and the server certificate that the web server should use in TLS connections using
that PoPSiCl (and that doubles as the certificate for verifying the client certificate). Admittedly
this is perhaps an abuse of the virtual-host mechanism, which presumably was not designed to
accommodate a virtual host per web-server client—a popular web server could have millions of
virtual hosts.
To get a sense for the scalability limitations that the existing Nginx virtual-host design would
impose, Figure 3.5b shows the degradation in responsiveness of the tenant web server as a func-
tion of the number of virtual hosts installed. These tests were conducted by first creating the
number of virtual hosts on the horizontal axis and then connecting to the server using a PoPSiCl
that matches one of these virtual hosts, to retrieve an object of either 10KiB or 100KiB.
Figure 3.5b shows the performance impact of the number of virtual hosts set up before the
connection. Each point is an average over 200 trials. The number of virtual hosts had no impact
on the response latency for the numbers we tested. However, the memory consumption of the
server with 60000 virtual hosts approached 2GiB. As in the case of vSwitch rules above, we
anticipate that this scalability limitation could be addressed with a virtual-host design that antic-
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ipates our proposed usage, e.g., relieving this memory pressure by writing the data for inactive
virtual hosts to stable storage.
DNS entries. Each PoPSiCl registration results in the creation of a new DNS record for the PoP-
SiCl, mapping the PoPSiCl to the addresses of SDN controllers in the datacenter where the tenant
resides. The number of DNS records could thus grow large, if the use of PoPSiCls became popu-
lar. We have not evaluated the potential performance impact of this growth on DNS resolutions,
however, since backing the DNS server with a simple database for these records would support
ample storage and fast access. Going further, the str portion of a PoPSiCl str.popsicls.com
could be computed to be the encryption (using a chosen-ciphertext-secure scheme) of the IP ad-
dress(es) to which it should be mapped, using a key that the DNS server holds. The DNS server
would then not need to store the mapping, but upon receiving a request to resolve str.popsic
ls.com could instead decrypt str and return the result.
3.6 Traffic Analysis
As discussed in Section 3.2.1, PoPSiCls hide the identity of the servers contacted by clients
from being directly disclosed to an attacker between the clients and the cloud. However, they
do not hide connection characteristics from the attacker. The connection characteristics include
packet size, packet timing, the number of packets per connection, connection volume, the number
of connections, connection duration, etc. What can be inferred from these features has long been
studied and debated, particularly in the context of traffic directed through anonymizing proxies
(e.g., [93, 65, 158, 69, 122, 86]) and, similarly, traffic logs in which payloads have been removed
(e.g., [48]).
Our design so far has left this issue to tenant servers to address, should they choose to. How-
ever, in this section we summarize an approach that we have developed for HTTP servers that can
be used to implement some proposed defenses to address attacks leveraging packet size to iden-
tify servers. We leave defenses for attacks leveraging other features to future work. In keeping
with R6, this defense can be deployed with very modest adaptations to web content. Also, the
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proposed approach relies on client-side Javascript and does not require the client user to install
new software (in keeping with R5). We stress that our goal here is not to innovate in terms of
new per-connection defenses, but instead to provide a framework in which such defenses can be
implemented.
3.6.1 Design
The key enabler for these defenses without requiring modifications to the client platform is
Javascript blobs14, which provide a way for client-side Javascript to construct file-like objects and
pass them to APIs that expect URLs. This functionality permits a tenant server to serve Javascript
to the client browser that customizes how objects are retrieved from the server, and then post-
processes the retrieved contents and provides them to the browser (as blobs) for rendering. So,
for example, the client-side Javascript could replace the retrieval of one web object with that of
many smaller objects and then reassemble the original object before providing it to the browser.
We have prototyped this approach in a simple adaptation to the Ruby on Rails web-content
development framework. This adaptation prepends a Javascript script to every HTML file; the
script takes control of retrieving the objects that otherwise would have been hyperlinked di-
rectly in that page. This script patches the XMLHTTPRequest class to remove padding and
reassemble the original object from smaller pieces of that object. When the send method of a
XMLHTTPRequest instance is called, instead of sending a single HTTP request to the server, it
sends several HTTP requests. The URL of each request contains the original URL and also an
extra query string that informs the server of the number of pieces into which to split the object at
that URL and the index of the piece to return in response. After receiving the first such request,
the modified Ruby on Rails framework splits the web object into the requested number of pieces;
the piece at the index indicated in each request is then returned as the request’s response, after ap-
pending padding and prepending the length of that padding to the piece (to allow for padding re-
moval). After the XMLHTTPRequest instance gets all the pieces of the original object, it reads
14http://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Blob
71
a length field at the beginning of each piece, strips the piece of any content (i.e., padding) that
extends past that length indicator, reassembles the original object, creates a blob containing the
resulting object, and submits it to the browser for rendering. Rewriting the XMLHTTPRequest
class ensures that even objects retrieved by other Javascript scripts in the page will be split and
reassembled in this way.
While providing a foothold for addressing traffic analysis based on the features of individual
object retrievals, this design does not interfere with hints that might be available to the attacker
based on his viewing multiple connections in aggregate, such as the number of servers that are
accessed simultaneously. Developing a similar foothold for obfuscating these features is a topic
of ongoing work.
3.6.2 Evaluation
To evaluate the performance impact of this form of traffic-analysis defense, we modified an
open-source blog site15, which is written in Ruby on Rails, to adopt it. In terms of modifications
to the application-specific web content itself, we needed to modify only one line of embedded
Ruby code in two templates; the rest of the implementation is embedded in the Ruby on Rails
framework, hidden from the web-content developer. In our implementation, the Javascript code
chooses uniformly from among retrieving a web object in one, two, or three pieces, and each
piece is padded to make its size a multiple of 512 bytes. The root page of this website hyperlinks
to thirteen web objects of total size 474.3KiB. We evaluated our traffic analysis defense approach,
in terms of latency and throughput, by visiting this root page repeatedly, being sure to clear the
browser cache between retrievals.
Latency. We chose the Firefox browser for evaluating the latency of root-page retrievals via
HTTPS, PoPSiCls, and PoPSiCls with traffic-analysis defense (TAD) implemented as above, and
the Tor browser (v5.5.5). The latency was measured as the time of downloading and rendering
the whole web page. The experiment was repeated 20 times for each setting. As can be seen from
15https://github.com/natew/obtvse
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(a) Latency (b) Throughput
Figure 3.6: Performance of PoPSiCl with traffic-analysis defense (TAD), for retrieving a web
page hyperlinking to thirteen objects of total size 474.3KiB
Figure 3.6a, the latency of accessing the page using PoPSiCls with traffic-analysis defense is only
1.35× that of HTTPS, while the latency of Tor is 6.3× that of HTTPS.
Throughput. To measure throughput of root-page retrievals, we chose a headless browser,
PhantomJS16, as the web client. Though lacking a graphical user interface, PhantomJS still
parses HTML documents, runs Javascript code, and downloads hyperlinked web objects in a
web page. (The httperf tool, used in the throughput experiments of Section 3.5, does not parse
returned HTML.) We wrote a script to spawn PhantomJS processes in the background, and each
PhantomJS instance was scripted to visit the root page once and then terminate. By adjusting
the spawning rate, we adjusted the web-page request rate, and the response rate was measured
as the number of root-page retrievals completed per second. To ensure that the client was not the
bottleneck in these experiments, we ran the client in a physical node with 32 cores and 128GiB
memory. As can be seen in Figure 3.6b, the throughput of root-page retrievals using PoPSiCls
was approximately the same with or without traffic-analysis defense, and only slightly lower than




Scope of defense. Our design provides PoPSiCls only for servers hosted in a cloud that supports
their use. While major cloud operators host substantial numbers of web servers (e.g., [75]), for
example, obviously numerous web servers do not fall into this category, as well. Related to this
limitation is that a user must know or be directed to the cloud that hosts a server in order to regis-
ter a PoPSiCl for it. This information could be disseminated by the cloud, provided that the cloud
is trusted to not claim to host a web server that it does not (as a major cloud operator might be);
by a link to the appropriate PoPSiCl store from the web server itself, so that a user could leverage
one access to the server to be able to access it using a PoPSiCl subsequently; or by myriad other
means (e.g., social media).
Censorship. We assume a trustworthy cloud operator that is motivated to help tenants pro-
tect the privacy of their customers from an attacker who might try to observe their customers
connecting to them. This assumption is arguably stronger than most (though not all, c.f., [160])
threat models considered in works addressing censorship resistance. Indeed, in the context of
censorship by governments, clouds are often used by activists to circumvent censors, but this is
typically done without the cloud operator’s consent [58]. Major clouds have admittedly shown
little cooperation for resisting censorship by governments (e.g., [71]), preferring instead to ac-
commodate censorship for business reasons. Moreover, the PoPSiCl store is vulnerable to being
blocked. As such, our design seems unlikely to be deployed specifically to resist government cen-
sorship, but it still offers an opportunity for a cloud to actively contribute to privacy for customers
of tenant servers to which censors permit access (even while disallowing access to servers that
censors forbid).
Going further, it is conceivable that our design offers an attractive balance between social
responsibility and client privacy by assuming a trusted cloud that retains the ability to censor
servers. For example, evidence suggests that a majority of Tor “hidden services” are criminally
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oriented and the most frequently requested sites host child abuse imagery [121]. Such abusive
sites could be shut down by the operator once it is informed of the abusive content.
Traffic analysis. As discussed previously, our basic design (Section 3.3) leaves traffic analysis
to the tenant server to address, should it choose to. While we have made initial steps to support
per-connection traffic-analysis defense (Section 3.6), that defense does not immediately address
traffic analysis based on aggregates of connections, e.g., the number of servers to which connec-
tions are made or the relative timings of these connections. Defending against this type of attack
remains a very active area of research independent of our proposal (e.g., [65, 158, 122, 66]).
OS compatibility. Our current implementation of TCP hand-off (Section 3.4) requires that both
the controller and the tenant server run on the same Linux OS kernel version. We also disabled
the TCP timestamp and selective acknowledgment (SACK) options to facilitate TCP state migra-
tion. In future work, we aim to support TCP hand-off across different TCP stack implementations
so that PoPSiCls will be suitable for more heterogeneous deployments.
Compatibility with Universal 2nd Factor (U2F) protocol. Universal 2nd Factor (U2F) proto-
col [89] aims to improve web security and usability by specifying a standard for using a second-
factor device in web authentication. U2F protocol is supported by major browsers, including
Chrome, and popular websites. In U2F, a second-factor device, usually a USB-based security
key, generates a public-private key pair for each website in the registration phase. The key pair is
associated with the domain name of the registered website and stored in the second-factor device.
The public key is associated with the user account and stored in the web server. In the authentica-
tion phase, only if the user can generate a valid signature with the expected private key, will she
be successfully authenticated by the web server. Also, the second-factor device ensures that the
signature can be only used for the associated website to prevent phishing attack. PoPSiCl is used
as a normal domain name during the whole web session so it is compatible with the U2F protocol.
In order to use U2F, the user needs to register her second-factor device with the PoPSiCl-enabled
website every time she registers a new PoPSiCl.
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3.8 Summary
In this chapter we presented PoPSiCls, which are personalized pseudonyms for servers that
a client can use like regular, long-lived server domain names to open TLS connections to those
servers. We described a design and implementation for PoPSiCls that leverages trust in a cloud
to implement PoPSiCls for tenant servers that it hosts. PoPSiCls have several desirable security
and usability properties in our threat model. First, TLS connections established using a PoPSiCl
exhibit identifiers (domain names, IP addresses, and server public keys) to the attacker that he
cannot correlate against those exhibited in connections involving other clients or other tenant
servers. Second, the burdens placed on various parties in our implementation of PoPSiCls cor-
respond to their levels of technical capabilities: cloud operators bear the most (which, based on
our experience, is still minor); changes to tenant web servers can be hidden from web-content
developers by packaging these changes within VMs (in an IaaS scenario) or the cloud platform
(in a PaaS scenario); and tenants’ clients need only suffer minor changes to the user experience
and no changes to client software (in the case of web browsers). The last is important since client
users often lack the permissions or willingness to modify their platforms (e.g., due to the vulner-
abilities that those modifications can introduce [129, 46, 139]). We also illustrated extensions of
our design to permit the implementation of defenses against traffic analysis with no client-side
changes.
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CHAPTER 4: SNOWMAN: METERING GRAPHICAL DATA LEAKAGE TO DETECT
SENSITIVE DATA EXFILTRATION
Data theft by insiders is a threat that is especially difficult to prevent, as it involves misuse
of permissions that the insider presumably must be given to perform his/her duties in the organi-
zation. It is thus not surprising that such data thefts are so common; e.g., in healthcare, insider
threat is the most common cause of data leakage, accounting for 58% of incidents [145]. And,
of course, insiders were behind some of the highest profile data breaches of U.S. government
data, with the Manning [157] and Snowden [149] cases being two exemplars. All U.S. executive
agencies and military departments are now required “to monitor user activity on all classified net-
works in order to detect activity indicative of insider threat behavior” [119, §H.1], and a National
Insider Threat Task Force has been established “to develop a Government-wide insider threat
program for deterring, detecting, and mitigating insider threats” [2].
An approach to address data theft by insiders is to make sensitive data available to users only
by secure remote access. In this approach, programs execute on sensitive data only on computers
trusted by the organization, while users are permitted to interact with those programs/data only
remotely, perhaps from a less-trusted (even user-owned) computer or a “thin” client having no
persistent storage of its own. While this approach has been practiced for decades in various forms
(e.g., [167]), a current product embodying this approach is Citrix Virtual Apps and Desktops [1],
formerly marketed as XenApp and XenDesktop. The deployment of XenDesktop by Osaka
Gas [3] provides an illustrative example of the data security benefits that this approach can offer.
Despite the data-protection benefits of remote-only access, this approach is fundamentally
limited by the possibility that the user screenshots sensitive content or even photographs it using
another device. Distribution of such images can be discouraged through the introduction of wa-
termarks (e.g., by varying screen luminescence [72]). However, the ability to attribute the data
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leak to an individual after the data is already leaked might be ineffective in deterring the leak.
Moreover, since these watermarks must not interfere with the user experience, text data can be
recovered, sans watermarks, by applying optical character recognition to the images [39]. For
small text data files (e.g., a Word file that fits on one or two screens), it seems that there is little
hope for defending further against such insiders.
The premise of this work, however, is that for large amounts of sensitive text—e.g., large
documents, databases, or codebases—an effort to quickly display significant amounts of that
data to a computer screen to record it (e.g., using another device) is likely to induce patterns of
accessing that data that departs from the norm for interacting with it for legitimate purposes.
Combined with remote-only access, this observation might be leveraged to detect data theft
as it is occurring. In this chapter, we propose a system, called Snowman, to accomplish this
goal. Roughly speaking, Snowman monitors the transmission of sensitive data by a program to
a remote client via a graphical user interface, and raises an alert when the rate of transmission
exceeds what is typical for interacting with that data.
A central challenge in this approach is how to measure the amount of sensitive data transmit-
ted to a remote client. While the total volume of GUI data transmitted to the remote client is an
upper bound, such a bound is very coarse. For example, numerous ways of interacting with a
program—e.g., scrolling a document a few lines, up and down repeatedly—would result in an
ever growing estimate of leakage, even though only the same few lines of data are being rendered
to the user’s screen. Snowman therefore employs taint analysis (e.g., [115]) to track which sen-
sitive bytes taint each byte output to the remote user. By tracking the cumulative set of sensitive
bytes that taint the output to the remote user, Snowman can improve the accuracy of this upper
bound considerably, and even determine which sensitive bytes might have been leaked.
Unfortunately, multi-label (i.e., per sensitive byte) taint analysis on unmodified binaries is
very expensive, incurring a typical overhead of 7× or more [88]. To ensure that this overhead
does not interfere with the user experience, Snowman thus performs taint analysis only on a
replica of the program that replays the program’s execution alongside the program instance that
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interacts with the user. This replica lags behind the user-facing instance due to the overhead of
taint analysis, but as we will show, it needs not lag by much for typical user behavior. Herein lies
a core technical challenge that we solve in Snowman, namely how to efficiently conduct taint
analysis on a replica while forcing the replica to execute identically to the original, user-facing
execution.
Replication systems (e.g., [120, 20]) need to record asynchronous signals and scheduling
events, and to replay them to the replica at the exact same execution points as in the original
execution. Those systems rely on CPU hardware performance counters to measure the number
of instructions executed by the program to locate the right execution points at which to replay
them. However, conventional taint analysis tools [88, 26] use binary rewriting techniques to
insert analysis routines into the original code blocks, which would break the measurement of the
replica’s execution and so cause the replica to diverge from the original. Snowman employs a
novel architecture that conducts taint analysis in the kernel without disturbing the performance
counter measurements. To reduce the overhead of taint analysis, Snowman employs various
optimizations, such as excluding application basic blocks from in-kernel analysis where it can be
inferred that they have no tainted operands, caching instruction decoding results, copy-on-write
taint propagation, and garbage collection of taint tags corresponding to already-leaked data.
We have implemented Snowman to work on unmodified x86-64 Linux binaries and off-the-
shelf hardware. We evaluated Snowman on three widely used GUI programs: LibreOffice Writer
(a word processor), LibreOffice Calc (a spreadsheet program), and Gedit (a code editor). Our
evaluation shows that Snowman performs better than the Pin “null tool”, which serves as a base-
line for any Pin-based [97] taint analysis solution, and introduces only moderate overhead on
common user actions. The evaluation also shows that Snowman can easily distinguish normal
user behaviors from ones reflecting data copying in all tested programs, by analyzing the sensi-
tive data leakage patterns.
To summarize, our contributions are as follows:
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• To our knowledge, we provide the first system designed to detect copying of graphical output
to reconstruct sensitive data, e.g., to exfiltrate it later. Rather than focusing on watermarking to
assign responsibility for the theft after the released data is recovered, Snowman instead seeks
to detect the copying while it is occurring.
• We detail the design of Snowman, which performs multi-label taint-tracking only on a replica
of the user-facing execution, to minimize the performance impact to the interactive user ex-
perience. In doing so, Snowman simultaneously achieves exact replication of the user-facing
execution while performing multi-label taint tracking on it, without modification to the pro-
gram binary. Central to its efficiency are a variety of optimizations that render it far more
lightweight than straightforward solutions (e.g., based on Pin [97]).
• We show through evaluations of Snowman on a fully-featured word processor, spreadsheet
program, and code editor, that sufficiently aggressive copying can easily be differentiated
from normal usage examples based on the rate of GUI leakage of sensitive file output. We also
show that Snowman supports copying detection with minimal penalties to the responsiveness
observed by the user, and with modest delays from the time at which the leakage occurs.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We give background in Section 4.1 and de-
scribe the design and implementation of Snowman in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, we evaluate
Snowman in terms of its performance on various user actions and its capability of differentiating
malicious data-access patterns from normal ones. We discuss remaining challenges and possible
extensions in Section 4.4, and summarize this chapter in Section 4.5.
4.1 Background
Anomaly detection. Here we treat a malicious insider exfiltrating a large volume of sensitive
data from an organization as an anomalous behavior to be detected using anomaly-detection
techniques, of which many have been proposed (see, e.g., [34]). In anomaly-detection systems,
various events of the user and the running programs are logged. The logs might include, e.g., sys-
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tem calls, shell commands, file reads and writes, and others. These logged data are then provided
to the feature-based detection algorithms, which can be based on machine learning [117], data
mining [159], statistics [90], or information theory [91], to identify anomalies.
The main contribution of Snowman is offering a novel system architecture that (i) restricts
user’s interaction with the sensitive files to the GUI interface in a thin client and (ii) accurately
monitors the sensitive bytes leaked to the user. Snowman can generate logs containing the indices
of the leaked bytes and the timestamps of the leakage events, which can be used as features by
the anomaly-detection algorithms. This fine-grained sensitive data leakage pattern gives more
insight into the user’s intent compared with coarser patterns of access to files or file blocks. In
this sense, Snowman provides a new type of feature for anomaly-detection systems to analyze,
though our goal here is not to develop new anomaly detection algorithms ourselves.
Taint analysis. The conventional approach to monitor sensitive information flow is taint analy-
sis (e.g., [115, 45]). Taint analysis systems attach taint tags to the memory and register locations
whenever the program consumes sensitive data. Along with the execution of the program, the
taint tags are propagated from one location to another. Since the taint propagation rules are dic-
tated by the instruction semantics, taint analysis can accurately monitor how the sensitive data is
transformed and transferred, and whether it is leaked through the program’s execution.
Taint analysis can be implemented with dynamic binary instrumentation (e.g., [128, 88, 26,
106, 105, 83]) or virtualization (e.g., [77, 127, 41]). In inlined taint analysis systems [128, 88, 26,
77, 127, 41], the taint analysis logic directly interferes with the analyzed program’s execution
flow and thus introduces substantial overhead. For example, libdft, a state-of-art taint analysis
system, imposes 7.06× slowdown to the Firefox browser even after employing various optimiza-
tion techniques [88]. Some recent systems [106, 105, 83] aim to reduce overhead of the analyzed
program by decoupling taint analysis from the program’s execution. These systems record the
control flow and memory access information with Pin, a dynamic binary instrumentation tool,
and run the taint analysis logic on a separate thread with the recorded information. Snowman also
decouples taint analysis by replicating the program’s execution and conducting taint analysis only
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on the replica. Since Snowman doesn’t do heavyweight binary instrumentation, it adds less over-
head to the analyzed program compared with the Pin “null tool” (as will be shown in Section 4.3)
and hence all other Pin-based tools.
Some systems choose to implement taint analysis in hardware [50, 147, 155, 87] and usually
have better performance than the software based systems. However, custom hardware is not
widely deployed. Snowman has better applicability since it works on off-the-shelf hardware and
unmodified binaries.
Replicated execution. Replicating the execution of a multithreaded program in multicore sys-
tems is a challenging problem. Many sources of nondeterminism can lead to divergence of the
replicated execution. The first type of nondeterminism is caused by the program’s communi-
cation with the system or other programs via systems calls, e.g., read(), or instructions, e.g.,
RDTSC. Replication systems (e.g., [120, 20]) usually address this type of nondeterminism by
recording the nondeterministic inputs to the original execution and replaying the recorded val-
ues to the replica. The second type of nondeterminism is caused by shared-memory interactions
among threads or processes. To address this type of nondeterminism, the approaches taken by
replication systems include replicating all shared-memory accesses [124, 21]; scheduling one
thread or process at a time and replicating the scheduling decisions [112, 144, 120]; assuming
the program is race-free and replicating the synchronization events by instrumenting the syn-
chronization library [15, 14, 53]; or applying a deterministic scheduling algorithm to remove the
nondeterminism in shared-memory interactions [20, 19, 54].
Replicating the program’s execution can be also achieved by running the program in a virtual
machine and replicating the execution of an entire virtual machine [59, 164, 60, 29]. However,
doing so introduces unnecessary overhead of replicating the execution of the operating system
and other programs. There are also replication systems [113, 79, 163] relying on custom hard-
ware to reduce overhead. We adapted RR [120], an open-source tool from Mozilla, to implement
Snowman’s replication subsystem. We chose RR because it works on unmodified binaries and
off-the-shelf hardware. Additionally, RR doesn’t assume race-freedom of the replicated program
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so that programs with data races (e.g., programs using lock-free data structures[153]) can be
directly replicated by RR.
Replication and dynamic analysis. Several previous works [124, 53, 57, 84] explored the idea
of combining replication and dynamic analysis. Unlike Snowman, which replicates and analyzes
the execution of the program concurrently with the original execution, these systems can repli-
cate the previously recorded execution of the program only after the program exits, to conduct
analysis for debugging, auditing, or attack provenance. In addition, the high overhead caused by
replicating every shared-memory interaction [124] or replicating a virtual machine [57], as well
as assuming race-freedom [53, 84], do not fit our use cases.
4.2 System Design and Implementation
4.2.1 Overview
Figure 4.1: Snowman architecture: (1) commu-
nicate user inputs and graphical outputs (over
the network); (2) record program execution;
(3) replicate program execution; (4) monitor
sensitive data leakage
In Snowman, GUI programs with permis-
sions to access sensitive files run in a remote
server. A user employs her personal computer
to interact with the GUI programs over the
network. The GUI programs take user inputs,
such as mouse clicks and keyboard strokes,
do computations, and deliver graphical out-
puts to the user computer. In our threat model,
the user computer is not trusted and the user
might intend to steal sensitive information.
However, we assume the server computer and
all software running on the server are trusted
and don’t have security vulnerabilities. The only channel where a user can get sensitive infor-
mation is the graphical outputs generated by the remote GUI programs. Our system aims to
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accurately monitor the amount of sensitive file information flowing from the remote server to the
user computer without affecting the normal usage of the GUI programs.
To accomplish this, Snowman replicates the execution of the analyzed program and conducts
taint analysis on the replica, to minimize the impact of that analysis on the performance of the
original execution. Our system works on legacy x86-64 binaries without requiring custom hard-
ware or recompilation. Figure 4.1 shows the overall architecture of our system. The graphical
user interfaces of the program are displayed in the user computer (a thin client). In the remote
server, the replication engine creates and maintains a replica for every thread and process of the
monitored program. The replicas maintain the exact same execution states as the original threads
and processes, including memory values, register values, and control flows. The analysis engine
conducts taint analysis on the replicated processes by attaching and propagating taint tags to
monitor the sensitive information flow. There are many challenges in efficiently performing taint
analysis and, at the same time, faithfully replicating the original program’s execution. We will
give detailed descriptions of our system in the following sections.
4.2.2 Replication Engine
The implementation of the replication engine is based on RR [120], which is designed to
record and replay multi-threaded Linux programs with low overhead, and is useful in debugging
concurrency bugs. Instead of replaying the whole execution after the program exits, we adapt RR
to run a replicated program side-by-side along with the original program execution throughout its
lifetime.
The core problem solved by RR is faithfully replicating the execution of a multi-threaded
program. In principle, if all non-deterministic inputs and events of the original execution are
recorded and replayed to the replica, the replicated execution should be the exact same as the
original one. RR runs in user-space and monitors the target program via the ptrace system
call. RR can observe various events of the monitored program including system calls and signals.
Whenever a monitored process enters or exits a system call, it is suspended and RR is notified.
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For system calls that spawn a new process or thread, like fork() and exev(), RR creates a
corresponding replicated process or thread and copies the original memory and register state to
the replica. For the system calls that consume non-deterministic inputs, such as read() and
gettimeofday(), RR records the inputs to the system call from the original process and
replays them to the replicated process without actually executing the system call. RR also deals
with inputs from non-deterministic instructions, including RDTSC and RDRAND, by emulating or
rewriting those instructions.
Besides non-deterministic inputs to system calls and from non-deterministic instructions, RR
also needs to record and replay the non-deterministic events. The first type of non-deterministic
events is scheduling events. Multiple threads of the same process run concurrently and do compu-
tations on shared data, and so different thread schedules could lead to different outcomes of the
program. Without replaying the scheduling events, the replica’s execution could diverge. Another
type of non-deterministic events is signals. Signals usually interrupt the normal execution flow of
the program. If a signal handler is registered, it will be called to handle the arrived signal. Since
the signal handler could compute on data shared with normal program code, similar to scheduling
events, we have to record and replay the signals to avoid divergence.
RR acts as a scheduler to the monitored program and only schedules one thread at a time.
By using a deterministic performance counter of the Intel CPU, RR tracks the number of retired
conditional branches (RCB) and uses the RCB counts to mark the progress of the program’s
execution. Whenever a non-deterministic event happens in the original program, RR records
the timing, measured by the RCB count, of that event, and replays this event in the exact same
execution point of the replica. RR instructs the CPU to fire an interrupt after a specified number
of conditional branches are retired by the replica to control the timing of the event replay. If it is a
scheduling event, RR preempts the replicated threads to replay the schedule. If it is a signal, RR
emulates the execution of the signal handler without delivering a real signal to the replica.
During the original execution of the program, RR records the aforementioned data. Con-
sumption of the recorded data is sometimes slower than its generation because conducting taint
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analysis on the replicated program could slow down its execution. The replication engine buffers
the recorded data in the file system, so that the original program execution can advance normally
without having to wait for the replica.
4.2.3 Analysis Engine
If the replication engine maintains a replicated program execution that progresses exactly as
the original one, conducting taint analysis on the replica should expose the same sensitive infor-
mation flows as occurred in the original. The analysis engine’s goal is thus to track which sensi-
tive file bytes taint GUI outputs of the replica execution (and so of the original execution, to the
client computer) without causing the replica’s execution to diverge from the original. libdft [88]
and other similar tools (e.g., [45, 26]) use dynamic binary instrumentation to transform the orig-
inal code blocks to semantically equivalent ones intertwined with the taint analysis logic. We
don’t take such an approach to implement the analysis engine since adding additional instruc-
tions in the replica would confuse the RCB counts measured by the replication engine, which
might lead to divergence of the replicated execution due to the non-deterministic events being
inserted in the wrong execution point. As such, the analysis engine in Snowman takes a different
approach, which we summarize in this section.
4.2.3.1 Architecture
Snowman defines each memory or register byte as an individual taint unit, to which it asso-
ciates taint tags dynamically. The instructions executed by the program dictate how the taint tags
should be propagated. For example, if the program executes “mov ebx, eax”, which moves
four bytes of data from the eax register to the ebx register, the analysis engine should move the
taint tags on each byte of the eax register to the corresponding byte of the ebx register. Strictly
speaking, the analysis engine is required to perform this type of analysis on every instruction
executed by the program.
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In Snowman, the analysis engine is implemented as a Linux kernel module, and all taint
analysis operations are done in kernel space, which don’t interfere with the RCB counts of the
user-space replica. For the replica, the analysis engine maintains shadow memory address spaces
and shadow registers that store taint tags for the corresponding memory and register bytes. Dif-
ferent threads of the same process share the same shadow memory address space but have their
own shadow registers. A strawman approach to implement taint analysis is running the replica
in single-step mode. After the execution of each instruction, the CPU traps to kernel mode and
transfers control to the analysis engine. The analysis engine then decodes the binary instruc-
tion and decides how to propagate taint tags based on the instruction’s opcode (e.g., mov) and
operands (either memory or register operands). This approach works but is too slow since each
instruction triggers a CPU context switch from user mode to kernel mode.
One source of optimization is the observation that we need to analyze an instruction only
if its operands have taint tags. Leveraging this observation, the analysis engine checks, at the
beginning of each basic block, whether the register operands of the instructions in the basic block
contain taint tags by inspecting the shadow registers. If any register operand has taint tags, the
analysis engine sets the CPU to single-step mode for this basic block. If not, the analysis engine
sets a breakpoint at the last instruction of the basic block, which lets the analysis engine seize
control and check the next basic block. This design often induces one context switch per basic
block instead of per instruction, which could be a big performance gain if only a small percentage
of instructions touch tainted registers.
Figuring out whether the memory operands of a basic block contain taint tags is a more com-
plicated task. Since some memory operands can be indirectly addressed—e.g., in “mov eax,
[ebx]”, where the address of the memory operand is the value of the ebx register—we may not
know the address of the memory operand at the beginning of the basic block. As such, we cannot
decide whether the basic block should run in single-step mode by only inspecting the shadow
memory. To solve this problem, the analysis engine changes each memory page that contains
tainted memory to kernel-only pages by modifying its page table protection bit. Whenever an
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instruction in the program accesses those protected pages, the CPU generates a page fault and
transfers control to the analysis engine. The analysis engine then changes the accessed page to
user-accessible and sets the CPU to single-step mode. After that, every instruction in that basic
block will be analyzed by the analysis engine.
Figure 4.2: State transitions: (1) consume sensi-
tive data; (2) contain taint tags; (3) finish basic
block; (4) no taint tag; (5) finish basic block; (6)
protection page fault
As shown in Figure 4.2, each replicated
thread is classified as being in one of four
states by the analysis engine. When the replica
process has not consumed any sensitive data
and there are no taint tags in the shadow mem-
ory or shadow registers, all threads of the
replicated process are in Initial state, and the
analysis engine does not set breakpoints at
basic-block boundaries. As soon as the replica process consumes sensitive data, all threads transi-
tion to Undecided. When a thread is in the Undecided state, the analysis engine checks whether
the register operands in the current basic block contain any taint tags. If so, the thread is transi-
tioned to the Single-step state and every instruction in the basic block will be analyzed individ-
ually. After the thread finishes the last instruction of the basic block, it is transitioned back to
the Undecided state. If the register operands are not tainted, the thread transitions to the Block-
step state, and the analysis engine sets a breakpoint at the last instruction of the basic block and
changes all tainted pages to be kernel-only pages. If the thread accesses any tainted page, it is
transitioned to Single-step. If the thread finishes the basic block without accessing any tainted
pages, then it is transitioned to Undecided. This state machine ensures that every possible tainted
data flow will be captured and analyzed by the analysis engine.
4.2.3.2 Taint Analysis
To monitor the amount of sensitive data leaked out of the GUI program replica through its
graphical outputs, the analysis engine assigns a different taint tag to each byte of the sensitive
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data consumed by the replica. Each shadow memory or register byte can be attached with a list of
different taint tags. When the graphical output data is sent out of the system, the analysis engine
inspects what taint tags are contained in the output bytes to track which sensitive bytes have been
leaked out.
During taint analysis, the analysis engine applies different analysis rules on different instruc-
tions based on their semantics. The instructions involving direct taint propagation can be divided
into four categories: movement instructions, arithmetic instructions, logical instructions, and
transformation instructions.
Movement instructions. Movement instructions move data among memory and registers, or
assign immediate values to memory or registers. By this definition, mov, pop, and push are
movement instructions. Bit shift instructions, like shr and shl, are also categorized as move-
ment instructions since they can be considered as moving data within a register or memory loca-
tion. For the movement instructions, the analysis engine first locates the source and destination
operands, and then replaces the taint tags in the destination shadow memory or register, byte by
byte, with the ones from the source. If the source operand doesn’t contain any taint tags or is an
immediate value, then the analysis engine clears the taint tags in the destination.
Arithmetic instructions. Arithmetic instructions do arithmetic operations on the source operands
and save the result to the destination operand. add, sub, mul, div, and inc are common arith-
metic instructions. For unary instructions like inc, we don’t need to change the taint state of
their operand. For binary instructions, the analysis engine first accumulates all the taint tags from
every byte of the source operands, and then assigns this list of taint tags to every byte of the des-
tination operand in the shadow memory or shadow register. There is a special case for sub, or
sbb, instruction. If the source operands of sub are the same, the analysis engine clears the taint
tags in the destination operand. For example in “sub eax, eax”, the taint tags in eax are
removed.
Logical instructions. Logical instructions do bitwise logical operations on memory or register
operands. Different from the arithmetic instructions, in a logical instruction, each byte of the
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destination operand is affected only by the corresponding bytes of the source operands, and so
the analysis engine assigns only the taint tags from those source-operand bytes to the correspond-
ing byte in the destination operand. Special cases here are and and xor. If one of the source
operands in and is the immediate value 0, then the analysis engine clears the taint tags in the
destination operand. If the source operands of xor are the same, the taint tags in the destination
operand are also cleared.
Transformation instructions. Transformation instructions change the data representation of an
operand from one type to another. For example, cvtsi2sd changes the data from an integer rep-
resentation to a scalar double-precision floating-point representation and moves the data from the
memory or a general register to a SIMD (single instruction, multiple data) register. Semantically,
every byte of the source operand affects every byte of the destination operand, so analysis engine
accumulates all the taint tags from every byte of the source operand, and then assigns this list of
taint tags to every byte of the destination operand.
Figure 4.3: Examples of taint propagation
Figure 4.3 gives examples of taint propaga-
tion for different types of instructions.
4.2.3.3 Code Caches
The analysis engine decodes each instruc-
tion to figure out 1) its opcode; 2) the names
of any register operands; 3) the base register,
index register, scale factor, and displacement
of any memory operands; and 4) the value of
any immediate operands. For each basic block,
the analysis engine needs to know which reg-
isters are included in the basic block to decide
whether they are tainted, to make decisions
about state transitions (as described in Section 4.2.3). Decoding instructions is expensive, taking
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around 1000 CPU cycles per instruction. To leverage the space and time locality of code execu-
tion, similar to the CPU instruction cache, we use two in-memory software caches to speed up
taint analysis.
Instruction cache. The instruction cache stores the decoded information—opcode, operands,
etc.—of instructions. Whenever an instruction is executed, the analysis engine checks whether
the instruction is in the cache with an index calculated by the instruction’s virtual memory ad-
dress. If it is not in the cache, the analysis engine decodes the instruction and caches the results.
Otherwise, the cached information is directly used without decoding the instruction.
Block cache. We also use a block cache to store the names of register operands in basic blocks.
At the beginning of each basic block, the analysis engine checks whether the register names are
cached, with an index calculated by the starting address of the basic block. If it is a cache miss,
the analysis engine has to decode each instruction in the basic block to get the register names.
This decoding step can be accelerated by the instruction cache.
4.2.4 Implementation
We implemented the replication engine with 61 lines of C++ code on top of Mozilla RR
v5.2.0. We implemented the analysis engine with 4454 lines of C code as a kernel module in
Linux v4.11.12. We integrated the Zydis1 disassembler into the analysis engine to decode x86-64
instructions. We will discuss some implementation details in this section.
Analyzed instructions and functions. We implemented taint analysis rules for 28 movement
instructions, 14 arithmetic instructions, 12 logical instructions, and 5 transformation instructions.
Those are commonly used instructions including a set of SIMD (single instruction, multiple data)
instructions. We do not propagate taint tags to the eflags register and we ignore implicit data
flows caused by control-flow dependencies. Many previous works (e.g., [115, 88]) also ignore the
implicit data flow to avoid over-tainting.
1https://zydis.re/
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Some library functions are hooked and analyzed by our system. The analysis engine hooks
open(), close(), and read() in the glibc library to add taint tags when the program opens
and reads sensitive files. The analysis engine also hooks XRenderCompositeText() in the
xrender library to inspect whether the rendered text contains taint tags.
Shadow memory and registers. Each memory and register byte (both for general registers
and SIMD registers) has a corresponding “shadow byte” maintained by the analysis engine. The
“shadow byte” is actually a pointer to the head of a singly linked list of taint tags. A taint tag is
a 32-bit integer, and so taint tags can track up to 4GB of sensitive data. We use a linear array to
store the register “shadow bytes” for each thread. The data structure for the memory “shadow
bytes” is a combination of a hash table and a linear array. Specifically, “shadow bytes” of a mem-
ory page are stored in a 4096-entry array. The location of this page array is saved in a hash table
using the page address as the hash key. This hybrid design strikes a good balance between using a
pure hash table and a pure linear array, where the former might trigger too many hash collisions
while the latter consumes too much memory.
Taint tag allocation is a time-consuming operation and costs kernel memory. We implemented
a copy-on-write taint propagation scheme to avoid unnecessary tag allocation. For the move-
ment instructions, we only copy the pointer of the taint list from the source “shadow byte” to the
destination “shadow byte” and increase the reference count of that pointer by one. For the arith-
metic and logical instructions, where the source taint tags will be merged into the destination taint
tags, we make a new copy of the taint list from the destination “shadow byte” if that list is also
referenced elsewhere and then merge the source taint tags.
We also implemented a garbage collection scheme to free memory used to track already-
leaked sensitive bytes. In our system, if a sensitive byte is leaked, we increase the leakage count
by one. Future leakages of that same byte don’t leak any more information and we don’t have to
keep tracking it. Therefore, we maintain a list of already leaked taint tags and periodically invoke
garbage collection to remove those tags from the shadow memory and shadow registers.
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Cache settings. As described in Section 4.2.3.3, we implemented a block cache and an instruc-
tion cache. The block cache is a direct-mapped cache that has only one element in each cache
entry. If a new basic block is mapped to the same entry as an old one, the old cache entry will
be replaced. Since a program usually executes a relatively small number of basic blocks, this
direct-mapped cache worked well in practice. Cache collisions are more frequent in the instruc-
tion cache, and so we implemented it as a two-way set associative cache (two elements in one
entry). If a cache collision happens, the least recently used cache block will be replaced. To en-
sure the correctness of the cached data, we don’t cache instructions and basic blocks if they are in
a writable and executable page.
Control transfers. The analysis engine needs to take control from the replica at the right times
to do taint analysis (see Figure 4.2). To make the replica run in single-step mode, we set the
TF bit in eflags register. We use the x86 debug register to set breakpoints at basic block
boundaries. We add hooks in the debug trap handler (do debug()) and the page fault han-
dler (do page fault()) to transfer control to the analysis engine. Since the replication engine
also sets single-step mode for some of its replay operations, we maintain an internal state to indi-
cate to the analysis engine to transfer control to the replication engine instead of directly to the
replica.
4.3 Evaluation
In this section, we focus on evaluating Snowman’s performance by measuring the reaction
time of various GUI programs to user actions. We also evaluate Snowman’s capability of differen-
tiating the data-leakage patterns of malicious insiders from those of normal users.
GUI programs. We selected three typical and widely used GUI programs—a word processor, a
spreadsheet, and a code editor—for our evaluations. The code editor is Gedit2 (v3.18.3), which
is pre-installed in many Linux distributions and has common features like syntax highlighting
2https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Gedit
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and word completion. The word processor and spreadsheet program are from LibreOffice3 (v5.4),
which is an open-sourced office suite (comparable to Microsoft office) and has a large user base.
In particular, LibreOffice is a fairly complicated multi-threaded program that has 9 million lines
of code (including C++, Java, and Python components)4. We believe testing Snowman with
LibreOffice would make a comprehensive validation of our design and implementation.
Environment. In the remote-access scenarios, the GUI programs ran in a Linux server that
installed Snowman with the customized v4.11.12 kernel. We interacted with the GUI programs
in a client machine that installed Ubuntu 16.04 with the v4.15.0 kernel. The client took mouse
and keyboard inputs and sent the inputs to the server. The server did computation, generated
graphical outputs, and sent the outputs to the client. The inputs and outputs were exchanged
through the X11 protocol5, which is the basic component of the Linux GUI framework, via TCP
connections. The client machine was equipped with a 2-core 3GHz CPU and 4GiB of memory.
The server machine was equipped with a 4-core 3.5GHz CPU and 8GiB of memory. The client
and server were connected by 1Gbps Ethernet links in a local area network.
4.3.1 Performance for Benign Users
A core indicator of the GUI program’s performance is its reaction time to user actions. To
accurately measure the reaction time, we used Wireshark6 to monitor the X11 packets passed
through the TCP socket in the client machine. The reaction time was calculated as the difference
between the departure time of the first user input packet and the arrival time of the last graphical
output packet triggered by the user action.
We measured the reaction time of various actions performed on LibreOffice Writer (the word
processor), LibreOffice Calc (the spreadsheet), and Gedit (the code editor). Each measurement






Start the program. Each program was started by entering a command in the terminal. The
reaction time was measured as the duration between the command key press and the first window
of the program displayed on the screen.
Open a file. We opened a 46KiB text file in Writer, a 25KiB spreadsheet in Calc, and a 88KiB
source code file in Gedit. The reaction time was measured as the duration between the open
button click and the full text rendered on the screen.
Close the program. We exited each program by closing its first window. The reaction time was
measured as the duration between the close button click and all graphical resources released by
the program.
Scroll down. For each program, we clicked the scroll bar once to scroll down the window by
one page. The reaction time was measured as the duration between the scroll bar click and the
new text rendered on the screen.
Search a string. We searched a string in each program. The reaction time was measured as the
duration between the search button click and the string being located on the screen.
Paste text. We pasted a 3984-character sentence in Writer, a 47-by-14 spreadsheet table in
Calc, and a 13-line source code snippet in Gedit. The reaction time was measured as the duration
between the paste button click and the pasted text rendered on the screen.
These actions were tested in five settings. In the first setting, the GUI program ran locally in
the client machine, which is the normal setting without data protection from remote-only access.
To assist reaction-time measurement, the X11 packets were transmitted through local TCP sock-
ets. In the other four settings, the GUI program ran on the server machine, and the user interacted
with the program through the client machine. Among these four settings, the first one ran the pro-
gram natively without instrumentation; the second one ran the program under the protection of
Snowman; the third one ran the program under the “null tool” of Pin [97] (v3.6); and the last one
ran the program under the “taint tool” of Pin (v3.6) with the reading bytes from the opened file
marked as tainted. The Pin “null tool” does the minimal amount of instrumentation to maintain
95
Figure 4.4: Reaction time for common user actions when running the programs locally 1) in
the client machine, remotely 2) in the server machine without instrumentation, 3) monitored by
Snowman, 4) by the Pin “null tool”, or 5) by the Pin “taint tool”
supervised execution of the program. The Pin “taint tool” conducts multi-label taint tracking and
employs the same set of taint analysis rules as Snowman. It was implemented by us and was used
to debug and validate the implementation of Snowman’s taint analysis engine.
Figure 4.4 shows the average reaction time of various actions in different settings, where the
error bar represents the standard deviation. Overall, the reaction time of the actions in Snowman
was 0.92× to 2.41× the reaction time of those actions in the remote-only setting without any
instrumentation. Among these actions, opening a file, starting and closing the program have rela-
tively large overhead (1.16× to 2.41×) because Snowman needs to record the non-deterministic
inputs and take extra steps to set up and tear down the environment for recording. However, we
don’t expect this would have significant impact on user experience since these actions are not
frequently triggered by the user in typical workloads. The reaction time of other actions in Snow-
man are comparable to those in the remote-only setting (0.92× to 1.19×).
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Additionally, Snowman performs better than the Pin “null tool” and “taint tool” in all tests.
Compared with the remote-only setting without any instrumentation, the reaction time overhead
is 1.05× to 23.07× in the Pin “null tool” and 4.3× to 133.1× in the Pin “taint tool”. The actions
triggering taint propagation (opening a file, scrolling down, searching a string, and pasting text)
have huge overhead in the Pin “taint tool”. We don’t claim this multi-label taint tracking tool
implemented by us has the best possible implementation. But we expect other similar tools would
have similarly considerable overhead because the taint analysis routines are inlined with the nor-
mal program code by the Pin instrumentation. Besides, considering that the “null tool” doesn’t
implement any instrumentation for taint analysis, which represents a lower bound for taint analy-
sis approaches implemented with Pin, Snowman should perform better than any Pin-based taint
analysis tools.
4.3.2 Data Exfiltration Detection
Snowman aims to detect data exfiltration by monitoring the amount of sensitive data leaked
to the user. Here we describe our evaluation of its efficacy in this regard, using the same appli-
cations as used for the performance evaluation for benign users in Section 4.3.1. That said, we
caution the reader that a holistic evaluation of Snowman as an anomaly detector is not possible
without a broad corpus of normal usage profiles for these programs. Given the variety of tasks
for which these types of applications are used and the varying levels of expertise of the users
who leverage these programs, it is difficult to envision how such a holistic evaluation could be
performed, or even if one anomaly detection algorithm would be suitable for all cases. Indeed,
we envision that individual deployments might leverage custom detectors, based on the types of
activities typically conducted by users, or even by individual users or on individual files.
Given these complexities, here we settle for a more primitive demonstration of the detection
capabilities of Snowman: we simulated a “typical” normal user session and a malicious user
session for each GUI program, and then showed that the leakage profiles of the two sessions
as observed by Snowman could be statistically differentiated with overwhelming ease (and the
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speed with which this differentiation could occur, etc.). We designed the “normal” sessions based
primarily on their representation in publicly available resources (see below), so that readers can
easily assess the nature of activities in each, should they so choose. Moreover, these sessions
were performed without undue delay or extra “thinking time,” so as to simulate a more rapid
leakage of data—and so, presumably, yielding a reasonably conservative evaluation. We discuss
the settings and results of this evaluation in this section.
4.3.2.1 Settings
In our evaluations, the GUI program ran in the remote server and we interacted with the
program in the client machine. Snowman maintained a replica of the program and conducted
taint analysis on the replica to measure leakage.
LibreOffice Writer sessions. In the normal session, we formatted an ebook document by fol-
lowing the instructions from the Kindle ebook formatting guide7. The document we used was the
first three chapters of the Python tutorial8 with all formatting removed. We started the session
by opening the document. Following the guide, we restored the format of the original tutorial
by changing fonts of the section titles, inserting hyperlinks, adding footnotes and page numbers,
and creating a table of contents. In the malicious session, we opened the same document, quickly
scrolled down the document, and physically took pictures of all the pages with our phone.
LibreOffice Calc sessions. In the normal session, we did calculations on a spreadsheet contain-
ing employment and salary information. The spreadsheet was created with an online template9
and filled with synthetic data (100 rows and 36 columns). Throughout the session, we calculated
the number of employees taking more than two days off, the average medical expenses, and the
total basic salary by using the built-in functions from Calc. In the malicious session, we quickly
scanned the whole spreadsheet and took pictures of all the rows and columns.
7https://kdp.amazon.com/en US/help/topic/G200645680 (This guide is based on Microsoft Word but we can find the




Gedit sessions. In the normal session, we edited a C file to finish an assignment from the MIT
Operating System Engineering class. We implemented the env init() and env setup vm()
functions by editing the env.c file, as required by exercise 2 of lab 3.10 We also opened the
env.h file to reference the related data structures. To best enable repeatability, we simply fol-
lowed the solution from a github repository.11 In the malicious session, we opened the env.c
and init.c files, and took pictures of all the file contents.
4.3.2.2 Leakage Detection
Snowman records various events of the monitored GUI program as described in Section 4.2.2.
Besides the event data, Snowman also records the timestamp of each event. So, when Snowman
detects a new leakage via its taint-tracking in the replica, it can report the timestamp of that leak-
age event from the original execution.
Figure 4.5 reports the total leakage from the sensitive files over time, as detected by Snow-
man, in the normal and malicious session of each program. The x-axis is the time of the original
user session. The y-axis is the total leakage. As can be seen there, in all three malicious ses-
sions, the sensitive bytes were leaked out within one minute. In the normal sessions, the leakage
occurred at a slower speed. Additionally, the normal sessions of the Calc and Gedit programs
leaked only a part of the file contents.
We applied a statistical analysis to test whether the malicious session and the normal session
can be easily differentiated. The analysis we used is the logrank test [22], which is usually ap-
plied to compare the survival experience of two groups of patients. We treat the new leakage of
a sensitive byte as analogous to the death event of a patient in this analysis. With the collected
data, we can calculate the time intervals between leakages and so the frequencies of data leak-
ages. We subjected the time intervals from the malicious session and the normal session of each




(a) Writer (b) Calc (c) Gedit
Figure 4.5: The amount of leakage in normal and malicious sessions, as a function of time
(a) Writer (b) Calc (c) Gedit
Figure 4.6: The time at which the Snowman replica detected each new leakage, as a function of
the time (in the user-facing execution) that the leakage originally occurred
9.925× 10−262, and 9.157× 10−168, respectively. Thus, we can safely reject the null hypothesis
that the leakage experience of the malicious session and the normal session are the same for all
three programs.
4.3.2.3 Detection Delay
Although the taint analysis conducted by Snowman doesn’t affect the program execution
with which the user interacts, it slows down the execution of the replica and adds delay to the
detection of the leakage event.
Figure 4.6 plots the time at which the replica detected each new leakage, as a function of the
time that the leakage actually occurred. In the normal sessions, the Snowman replica detected the
last leakage event with a lag of 6.9×, 7.8×, and 4.9× for Writer, Calc, and Gedit, respectively,
behind when that leakage event occurred. In the malicious sessions, detection of the last leakage
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event lagged by 38.2×, 25.1×, and 11.5× for Writer, Calc, and Gedit, respectively. Gedit has the
smallest lag, presumably because it has simpler code logic and takes less CPU cycles to process
user requests. For all three programs, the malicious sessions lag more than normal ones, since the
malicious user sent requests to the program at a higher frequency, leaving the replica fewer idle
cycles to catch up.
We also want to figure out how quickly Snowman can differentiate the malicious session from
the normal one. We adopted the following procedure to answer that question. In the timeline of
the replica’s execution, the leakage events from the malicious session, as detected by Snowman,
were added to one dataset, and the leakage events from the normal session were added to another.
These two datasets were updated at the end of each second of the replica’s execution time. We
started to apply the logrank test (the same as described in Section 4.3.2.2) on the updated datasets
after both datasets had more than 1000 leakage events. We stopped the procedure when the calcu-
lated p-value dropped below 0.05. The time at which we stopped is reported as the earliest time
Snowman could detect the malicious session (using the normal session as a “typical” baseline).
The earliest detection times were 1522s, 574s, and 276s for Writer, Calc, and Gedit, respectively
(shown as the dotted horizontal line in Figure 4.6).
4.4 Discussion
Taint analysis accuracy. Currently, we have implemented taint analysis rules for only a subset
of x86-64 instructions in Snowman. This subset includes every instruction that explicitly propa-
gates taint tags during the execution of the three tested programs (LibreOffice Writer, LibreOffice
Calc, and Gedit). To capture this subset of instructions, we added an assertion in the taint analy-
sis engine, which gives an alert if an executed instruction contains tainted operands but no taint
analysis rule was implemented for that instruction. For other programs, we can take the same
approach to select instructions for taint analysis.
Taint propagations caused by implicit data flows are ignored by Snowman. Implicit data
flows can exist in branch instructions where the branch condition variable decides which value
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will be saved to a given variable. There are also implicit data flows in pointer dereferences. In
some cases, the data value in a memory location is decided by the value of the memory address,
such as table lookups. Ignoring these implicit data flows can cause false negatives in the leakage
detection. However, enabling taint analysis for implicit data flows leads to false positives and
taint explosion [143], and for this reason has been excluded in many prior tools (e.g., [88, 115,
128]).
To reduce false negatives caused by table lookups, we choose to manually identify functions
which might propagate taint tags through table lookups and implement taint analysis rules based
on function semantics. Specifically, we hook and analyze the pango shape full() function
from the libpango library, which translates font indexes to unicode characters through table
lookups. Other functions can be analyzed in the same way as soon as they are identified. We also
plan to explore some existing techniques [73, 13] to address implicit data flows in the future.
Replication delay. The replica has to trap into the kernel to be analyzed by the taint analysis
engine. This trap happens at least once per basic block and can increase to once per instruction
if the basic block contains tainted operands. The frequent context switches between the user
and kernel modes add significant overhead. We chose to implement the taint analysis engine in
the kernel to avoid adding extra instructions into the replica. The benefit of doing so is that the
replication engine can then determine when to inject the asynchronous signals and scheduling
events by using the CPU retired conditional branch counter to measure the progress of the replica.
In theory it should be possible to implement taint analysis in user space by instrumenting the
binary and adjusting the measurements of the replica’s execution accordingly. We plan to explore
this option in the future.
Each CPU cycle in the original execution is amplified in the replicated execution due to taint
analysis overhead. The experiments in Section 4.3.2.3 show that the replica cannot catch up with
the original execution during the simulated session. However, the simulated user sessions don’t
represent real use cases since we omitted some idle time during the simulation. The idle time
is often caused by application waiting for user input when the user spends time on thinking or
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working on other applications. With enough idle time, the replica could catch up with the original
execution because the replica can fully utilize a CPU core. To better understand the implications
of replica delay, real usage patterns of the applications are needed. We plan to investigate this in
future work. It is also possible to run the replica in a machine with higher CPU clock rate than
the one where the original execution runs, so the replica can better keep up with the original
execution. On the other hand, the malicious user might intentionally trigger expensive operations
to increase the delay by which replica processing lags behind the original, in order to “buy time”
for copying data. Some malicious actions might also increase replication time due to excessive
computation. To detect such attacks, we could build a model of normal lag, i.e., a profile based
on the lag during normal user sessions for each program. If the lag during a user session deviates
substantially from that profile, Snowman can raise an alert of potential malicious behavior, or
alternatively slow down the user-facing execution.
Quick leakage estimation. Snowman’s accurate leakage tracking could be augmented with
a much quicker method of estimating the leakage based on examining the GUI traffic between
the user-facing execution and the thin client. Ideally this estimator would quickly approximate
the leakage with good recall and reasonable precision, to be corroborated (or corrected) by the
replica when its analysis is complete. In doing so, Snowman could be made even more responsive
to data exfiltration attempts. However, to tolerate false alarms by the estimator, a response to an
estimator-based alarm might be to only slow down the user-facing execution, for example, until
the taint-tracking replica catches up. We plan to investigate such an estimator in the future.
From differentiation to anomaly detection. We showed in Section 4.3.2 that it was trivial to
statistically distinguish our own sessions of normal activity from ones in which we simply paged
through files and photographed them, based on the leakage patterns determined by Snowman.
While these tests provide strong evidence that detecting theft (as long as it is sufficiently aggres-
sive) on the basis of a leakage profile is possible, the dearth of datasets characterizing the leakage
patterns of either normal or theft-oriented usage of the applications tested there renders it im-
possible to properly evaluate an anomaly detection methodology based on Snowman. Moreover,
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since a data-leakage profile during normal use might be highly dependent on the expertise of
the user and the type of file being accessed, there may not be a one-size-fits-all detector; rather,
leakage models created per user, per file, or at least per organization might be more appropriate.
Of course, there will be limits to what a purely volume-based approach can detect; i.e., a detector
based solely on the amount of data leaked so far will presumably fail to detect data exfiltration
performed very slowly, at a speed similar to normal usage. For such cases, analyzing the exact
order in which bytes are leaked—which Snowman also provides—might be necessary. Besides,
the presence of Snowman could at least slow down the data leakage rate in malicious situations.
Still, we believe that even our primitive studies already provide a strong basis to motivate the
further study of GUI leakage measurement as enabled by Snowman.
CPU usage. Snowman creates a replica for each GUI program. Each replica completely utilizes
a single CPU core for taint analysis. To make Snowman available for multiple users running
multiple GUI programs simultaneously, it is necessary to provision enough processors in the
datacenter beforehand based on the common load of Snowman. It is possible to run the replica
in a different machine from the one where the original program runs, so it is more convenient to
scale the system by dynamically migrating the replica to an idle machine.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter we presented Snowman, which aims to deter data theft by malicious insiders
through strong data isolation and fine-grained data monitoring. In Snowman, a user is restricted
to accessing sensitive data only remotely on a trusted server, via the GUI presented by the ap-
plication to a thin client. In the server, Snowman detects data theft by monitoring the number of
sensitive bytes leaked to the user. Maintaining good performance for normal usage of the mon-
itored program while accurately monitoring for data theft is challenging. Snowman addresses
this problem by replicating the execution of the program alongside its original execution and
conducting multi-label taint analysis on the replicated execution. Our implementation of Snow-
man works on unmodified Linux binaries and off-the-shelf hardware without assuming that the
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replicated application is race-free (unlike some previous replication solutions). Our evaluations
show that Snowman adds only moderate overhead for common user actions and, thanks to several
novel optimizations, is far more efficient than, e.g., Pin-based taint analysis solutions. We also
demonstrated that the data-leakage patterns of sufficiently aggressive malicious insiders can be
leveraged to easily distinguish them from normal ones.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
In this dissertation we have presented the design, implementation, and evaluation of dpprocfs,
PoPSiCl, and Snowman. These three systems all aim to efficiently protect data secrecy but face
unique challenges in their own scenarios. There is hardly a one-size-fits-all solution for data
protection. We choose to either noise, mask, or meter sensitive data based on sensitivity of the
system data, trustworthiness of the system components, and functional requirements of the sys-
tem.
dpprocfs applies differential privacy to introduce noise into the data reporting from the
procfs file system so as to bound information leakage mathematically. dpprocfs also reestab-
lishes invariants before releasing the noised outputs to avoid breaking applications that depend on
the invariants. Our evaluations show that dpprocfs can simultaneously defend against known
storage side-channel attacks while retaining the utility of procfs for monitoring and diagnosis.
Our solution provides a configurable framework to suppress new storage side channels as they are
discovered, through adding protection to additional kernel data-structure fields or updating the
ε values associated with each field and application. We further believe that the mechanisms we
have developed within our solution might be applicable to other storage side channels, and we
plan to explore this direction in future work.
In PoPSiCl, a trusted cloud operator cooperates with its tenants’ clients to mask server
identifiers with personalized pseudonyms before transmitting server connections over untrusted
networks. When instantiated for TLS-based access to tenant web servers, PoPSiCl works with
all major browsers and requires no additional client-side software and minimal changes to the
client user experience. Moreover, changes to tenant servers can be hidden in supporting software
(operating systems and web-programming frameworks) without imposing on web-content de-
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velopment. Our security analysis shows that PoPSiCl enforces server anonymity when facing
both passive and active network attackers. Our evaluations show that performance for PoPSiCl
access to tenant servers is competitive with baseline HTTPS and scales well as PoPSiCl use
grows. We thus believe that PoPSiCl provides a promising opportunity for cloud operators to
improve privacy for its tenants’ clients.
Snowman restricts the user to access data only remotely and accurately meters the sensitive
data output to the user through the graphical user interfaces. To conduct this metering without
slowing the interactive user session, leakage is concurrently tracked in a replica of the applica-
tion execution. This, in turn, introduces a key technical challenge that Snowman solves, namely
identically replicating execution of an unmodified Linux binary while also performing efficient
multi-label taint-tracking on it. We show through empirical measurements with a word processor,
a spreadsheet program, and a code editor that Snowman induces little overhead on interactive
user sessions and easily differentiates data-access patterns induced by normal usage and suffi-
ciently aggressive data theft with reasonable responsiveness.
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[170] Y. Zhang and M. K. Reiter. Düppel: Retrofitting commodity operating systems to mitigate
cache side channels in the cloud. In 20th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, pages 827–838. ACM, 2013.
[171] X. Zhou, S. Demetriou, D. He, M. Naveed, X. Pan, X. Wang, C. A. Gunter, and K. Nahrst-
edt. Identity, location, disease and more: Inferring your secrets from Android public
resources. In 20th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2013.
[172] Z. Zhou, Z. Qian, M. K. Reiter, and Y. Zhang. Static Evaluation of Noninterference Using
Approximate Model Counting. In 39th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages
1029–1043. IEEE Computer Society, 2018.
[173] F. Zhu and J. Wei. Static analysis based invariant detection for commodity operating
systems. Computers & Security, 43, June 2014.
[174] H. Zolfaghari and A. Houmansadr. Practical censorship evasion leveraging content delivery
networks. In ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Oct. 2016.
120
